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COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Corporate networks are private communications
networks used by corporations or closed-user-groups
("CUGs") to enhance intra-organizational informa-
tion transfer and communications.' Unlike corporate
communications supported by traditional "dial up"
services via the public service telecommunications
network ("PSTN") and public data network
("PDN"), private corporate networks are dedicated
networks and, therefore, can be specially tailored to
meet a corporation's or CUG's networking needs.'
As such, private corporate networks help corpora-
tions and CUGs reduce overall communications
* Mr. Nikolopoulos is an associate at the Washington D.C.
law firm of Blooston, Mordkofsky, Jackson & Dickens. He
practices telecommunications law with a specialty in European
Union telecommunications law. The firm practices telecommuni-
cations, international communications, and cable television regu-
lation. Mr. Nikolopoulos previously worked for the European
Commission in Brussels, Belgium.
1 Corporate networks are also known as private networks,
private branch exchange ("PBX") networks, enterprise-wide
networks, leased-line networks, CUGs and intra-organizational
networks. If they are operated in-house, they are generally
known as private corporate networks. If a third-party operates
the network, it is typically called an "outsourced" corporate net-
work. A CUG is a group of organizations that share some com-
mon interests, usually economic in nature, and find it convenient
to share the cost and expense of a common communications net-
work. Hereinafter, the terms "private network" and "corporate
network" will be used interchangeably.
' See Dennis L. Weisman, The Proliferation of Private Net-
works and Its Implications for Regulatory Reform, 41 FED.
COM. L.J. 331, 335 (1989). "A private network may be defined
generically as the use of dedicated facilities, either publicly
provisioned or privately constructed, for the transmission of
voice, video, or data traffic over an integrated system not accessi-
ble to the general public." Id. Steve Valiant & Robert Rosen-
berg, Evolving Private Networks In Europe, TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS, Feb. 1993, at 28. "Each company's network is unique,
custom-built to its business needs. In fact, network planning is
increasingly influenced by business determinants, such as com-
petitive pressures, the complexity of doing business, and the in-
ternationalization of the company." Id. See also Principle and
Timetable, The European Commission's Green Paper on the
Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable
TV Networks, Part One, COM(94)440 final at 27 n.47 [herein-
after Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part I](noting that
"[c]orporate networks are generally networks established by a
single organisation encompassing distinct legal entities, such as a
company and its subsidiaries or its branches in other Member
States incorporated under the relevant domestic company law").
3 See NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION (91-26)
costs,' enhance operational efficiencies, pioneer new
technologies,' and increase reliability and security of
internal communications.5
For several years, corporations and CUGs based
in the United States have had the luxury of freely
exploiting private networks, either by establishing
such networks themselves, or by purchasing private
network services from third parties. They have had
this luxury because in the United States telecommu-
nications policy and regulation has long favored the
proliferation of private networks.' In contrast, corpo-
rations and CUGs based in Europe have not, at least
(1991), at 150 [hereinafter NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT]
("Private networks presently complement the public network by
affording large users specialized features at low cost."). Id. See
also DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUS., STUDY OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.K. TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS INFRASTRUCTURE (1994) [hereinafter DTI INFRASTRUC-
TURE STUDY] (noting that organizations establish private
networks primarily to reduce costs).
" See Arthur D. Little, Final Report to the Commission of
the European Communities, Issues and Options 1992-2010,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Oct. 1991, at 6 [hereinafter Arthur D.
Little Report].
Innovative services often find an initial demand among
limited user sets - new compressed-voice technology, for
example, has appealed to some large corporations who can
fund the necessary investment. Private corporate networks
allow a means of proving this new demand. Once the costs
come down and a wider demand materialises, such new
technologies mature and lend themselves to more ubiqui-
tous implementation and subsequent economies of scale.
Id.
, See DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note 3, at 68
(noting that "businesses have other reasons for establishing net-
works of leased lines, including security, quality of service, and
the ability to overlay software defined network functions"); see
also DATAPRO, VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS, TECHNOLOGIES
SECTION (1992), at MIT20-900-901 [hereinafter DATAPRO
VPN REPORT].
See Weisman, supra note 2, at 345-46, 349.
The genesis of private network development in the United
States can be traced back at least to an FCC allocation
decision in 1959. [Further,] the FCC moved more boldly
than ever in encouraging the proliferation of private net-
works when in 1985 it allowed firms to resell excess ca-
pacity on private networks on a for-profit basis.
Id. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS SERVICES IN EUROPEAN MARKETS 56 (1993) [here-
inafter OTA REPORT]. "In the United States, corporate private
networks using leased lines proliferated in the 1980s, as large
corporations sought less expensive and more flexible ways to ob-
tain voice and data services." Id.
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until recently, been able to enjoy the same luxury.7
Indeed, in Europe the proliferation of effective pri-
vate networks has long been discouraged by an in-
hospitable regulatory environment, largely balkan-
ized at the national level.8
As a consequence, at the end of 1993 it was esti-
mated that over 700,000 private networks had been
established in the United States, while only 14,000
or so were established in Europe.' This difference in
the number of private networks is particularly stark
in light of the fact that 5,000 of these networks were
located in the United Kingdom,10 one of the only
countries in Europe with a favorable regulatory en-
vironment." This relative scarcity of private net-
works in Europe has meant that corporations and
CUGs in Europe have not been able to exploit the
competitive aspects of private networks, and, there-
fore, have been placed at a competitive disadvantage
vis-a-vis their American counterparts. 2
In order to rectify this situation, the European
Community ("EC"), now called the European
Union ("EU"),18 decided in 1987 to embark on a de-
Peter Heywood & Sam McMaster, PBX Networks in Eu-
rope, DATA COMM., Feb. 1992, at 70 (noting that "[flight now,
private voice networks are a rarity in many European coun-
tries"); German Market, OVUM LTD, Aug. 1992, at F3-3 (not-
ing that "corporate networks are relatively underdeveloped in
Germany . . .").
0 See Ids Zandleven, A Leading Light in Pan-European
Networking, INT'L NETWORKING, Sept. 1992, at 113 (noting
that the mere "[m]ention [of] 'European Networks' to U.S. net
managers and they'll probably think of low-speed links, regula-
tory hurdles, and equipment that's not quite the state of the
art").
9 Survey Telecommunications: The End of Monopoly,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 1995, at 10. See also Comments of Her-
mes Europe to the 1992 Telecommunications Review at 414
(Jan. 1993). Europe and the United States have roughly the
same populations with the same telecommunications penetrations
level. The total subscriber base lines in the United States and the
European Union are 132 million and 146 million respectively.
Id.
10 See DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note 3, at 68
(noting that at the end of 1990, the United Kingdom had 5,000
private networks, France had 2,500 and Germany had about
2,000).
" See generally id. at 14.
"' See Hermes Paper, supra note 9, at 414 (Europe has a
larger population than the U.S. and roughly a similar level of
telecoms penetration.)
"' The EU is a supra-national governmental body encom-
passing 15 European countries and consisting of four main insti-
tutions, The European Commission, The Council of Ministers,
The European Court of Justice and the European Parliament.
The EU succeeded the EC on November 1993 following the rat-
ification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The EU encompasses
the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
termined program of deregulation, liberalization, and
harmonization outlined in its famous 1987 Green
Paper on the Development of the Common Market
for Telecommunications Services and Equipment.4
In the six years following its adoption, the 1987
Green Paper has spawned a number of significant
legislative measures, primarily in the form of EU di-
rectives, that in toto have established a rather
favorable regulatory environment for the prolifera-
tion of private networks in Europe. 8 Particularly
noteworthy measures have been: (1) directives aimed
at liberalizing the terminal equipment and valued-
added services ("VAS") sectors; and (2) directives
aimed at harmonizing the conditions for access to the
public network and to public services, as well as
type-approval procedures and terminal equipment
standards."
Coupled with recent advances in communications
technology, these directives have gone a long way in
dismantling barriers that have heretofore discour-
aged the proliferation of private corporate networks
at both the national and pan-European level."
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
"4 Towards a Dynamic European Economy, Green Paper
on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommuni-
cations Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 final at figure 3
[hereinafter 1987 Green Paper]. The general objective of the
1987 Green Paper was:
the development in the Community of a strong telecom-
munications infrastructure and of efficient services: pro-
viding the European user with a broad variety of telecom-
munications services on the most favourable terms,
ensuring coherence of development between Member
States, and creating an open competitive environment, tak-
ing full account of the dynamic technological develop-
ments underway.
Id.
25 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 189. The Treaty states that
"a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved,
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." Id.
10 Study on Current Telecommunications Regulation in the
Member States, Final Report to the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities - Directorate General XIII prepared by
Coopers & Lybrand, Sept. 1992, at 3-3 (noting that in the Euro-
pean context VAS are services that do not offer as a separate
service either voice telephony or the direct transport of data in
real time).
17 Heywood & McMaster, supra note 7, at 70. Note that
"technologies such as voice compression and fast packet switch-
ing already enable users to squeeze more traffic into less
bandwidth, thus reducing line costs. That, in turn, is making
private networks more attractive [in Europe]." Id.
19961
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However, even with this progress, as compared with
the United States, significant regulatory and opera-
tional barriers to the proliferation of private net-
works still persist, albeit at a diminishing rate. This
is because in most Member States, public network
infrastructure 8 and basic voice telephony will. re-
main under monopoly control until at least January
1, 1998, the date scheduled for full telecommunica-
tions liberalization in the EU. 9
Incumbent telecommunications operators have
used this monopoly control to forestall the prolifera-
tion of private networks, particularly in situations
where private networks would directly compete with
monopoly networks and services. However, on bal-
ance, it can be said that the initial wave of liberali-
zation, unleashed in the seven years following the
adoption of the 1987 Green Paper, has and should
hasten the process of dismantling these remaining
barriers. This initial wave of liberalization has, for
example, spawned the creation of a number of
super-alliances that are putting intense competitive
pressure on the remaining monopolies in Europe.2
In addition, this wave of liberalization has prompted
Europe's notorious Public Telephone Organizations
("PTOs") 2 1 to re-think strategies, rationalize opera-
tions, 2  and, in an attempt to adapt to the impending
environment, reduce tariffs, remove restrictions, and
open up their networks to competing private net-
works.2 - The initial wave of liberalization has set the
stage for private network proliferation in the coming
18 See Green Paper On Infrastructure, Part I, supra note 2,
at 15-30 (noting that only the UK, Sweden and Finland cur-
rently allow infrastructure competition).
" Alan Cane, Customers Have the Advantages, FIN. TIMES,
June 15, 1995, § 3-1 (noting that "[r]egulation, in fact, remains
a barrier to progress especially in Europe where little change
will be seen before the 1998 deadline. Organisations building
private networks today [will still] have to deal with a plethora of
authorities and regulations"); ELI NOAM, TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS IN EUROPE 433 (1992). "European telecommunications
will, in the short run, experience a push by PTTs to extend and
defend their monopoly position and to expand in the direction of
new services and equipment operations. However, long-term
forces are at work that are likely to lead in time to an unraveling
of the monopoly system." Id.
"' Three major strategic alliances have been formed in Eu-
rope in response to the prospect of increased competition: (1)
Concert, a joint venture between British Telecommunications
and MCI; (2) Atlas, a joint venture between Deutsche Telekom
and France Telcom; and (3) Unisource, a joint venture between
AT&T, and the Swedish, Dutch, Italian and Swiss PTOs. See
generally Alan Cane, Competition Down the Line, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 1995, at 15.
"' PTOs are the successors to the Postal, Telephone and
Telegraph administrations ("PTTs") that largely predominated
in Europe until recently.
years, notwithstanding barriers that may result from
persisting PTO monopolies.2 4 Indeed, emboldened
by the new regulatory environment, EU businesses
spent 13 billion ecus on establishing and upgrading
corporate networks in 1993 alone.25 Analysts believe
that such investment will snowball as barriers drop.
As such, they are forecasting double digit growth in
corporate network investment for the coming years.26
Part I of this article briefly describes the various
categories and types of corporate networks. Part II
provides some historical background on each of these
categories and types of corporate networks. Part III
discusses the barriers that persist in the EU that hin-
der the proliferation of corporate networks. Part IV
canvasses the EU directives that have fostered corpo-
rate networking. Part V discusses the economic im-
plications of telecommunications liberalization in the
EU, and how economic imperatives will foster the
proliferation of corporate networks in the EU. This
article concludes that the initiatives taken in Europe
towards liberalization of telecommunications markets
have begun the process of fostering corporate
networking.
I. CLASSIFICATION OF CORPORATE NET-
WORKS
Corporate networks come in many forms and vari-
eties. However, in general, they are most often cate-
gorized by the type of traffic they support. For in-
22 See Richard Hudson, Ringing Changes: Europe Slowly
Moves Telecom Monopolies Toward Eager Markets, WALL ST.
J. EUR., Nov. 25-26, 1994, at 1 (discussing how Europe's PTOs
are adapting to prepare for the impending fully competitive
market)
'$ See John Blau, Telekom Hit By Defections, COMM. WK.
INT'L, Apr. 11, 1994, at 1. "A wave of customer defections to
foreign carriers has driven Deutsche Bundespost Telekom to in-
troduce a discount plan for companies with high volumes of in-
ternational telephone traffic." Id.
" Although PBX networks are still relatively rare in Eu-
rope, directives adopted by the EU have spurred PTOs in cut-
ting tariffs and relaxing usage restrictions on leased lines which
together have helped stimulate the proliferation of PBX net-
works. See Heywood & McMaster, supra note 7, at 70.
" Effects of Satellite Liberalisation on Corporate and CUG
Networks, Final Report, ANALYSYS, at 16, tbl. 6 (1994).
"6 Heywood & McMaster, supra note 7, at 71 (citing Inte-
lidata forecast that investment in PBX networks will experience
11% average annual growth over the next six years and noting
that strong growth is expected in Germany and Italy, where the
number of networked PBXs is expected to more than double by
1997); Broadband Communications, OVUM LTD, May 1992, at
F2-6. "[P]rivate networking [in Europe] ha[s] accelerated in us-
age." Id.
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stance, networks that support intra-corporate voice
traffic are typically dubbed corporate voice or PBX
networks.17 Those that support data traffic are
dubbed corporate data networks, and, depending on
their geographical expanse, can be more specifically
described as either local area networks ("LANs"),
metropolitan area networks ("MANs") or wide area
networks ("WANs"). 8 Finally, those that support
two or more types of traffic simultaneously are
dubbed "integrated networks."
In addition to these three general categories, cor-
porate networks can be further classified into three
categories by referencing the ownership, manage-
ment and operation of the network. 9 For instance,
networks that are owned, managed, and operated in-
ternally by corporations are typically dubbed private,
in-house networks (i.e., insourced networks).80 Such
networks are usually comprised of four basic net-
work elements:"1 (1) terminal equipment that gener-
27 Typical corporate voice networks support (1) Direct dial-
in; (2) call-waiting; (3) conference call; and (4) reminder func-
tions. See generally WILLIAM STALLINGS, BUSINESS DATA
COMMUNICATIONS 322 (1990).
28 See DATAPRO, BASIC CONCEPTS OF COMMUNICATIONS,
TECHNOLOGIES SECTION, (1994), at MIT20-600-101.
A local area network (LAN) is a communications net-
work, which is usually owned and operated by the busi-
ness customer. A LAN operates over a limited geographic
area and enables many independent peripheral devices,
such as terminals, to be linked to a network through
which they can share central processing units, memory
banks, and a variety of sources. Some organizations (e.g.,
banks) have enough data traffic within a city to make in-
tracity networking viable. In this case individual LANs
are interconnected to form a metropolitan area network
(MAN). A communications network which spans a large
geographical area and interconnects remote sites, for ex-
ample, the national telephone network is called a wide
area network (WAN).
Id.
21 See Robbert Daan, Design and Develop Your Own VPN,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, June 1994, at 25 (noting that network-
ing traditionally falls into three categories, private, hybrid and
virtual private).
80 See DATAPRO VPN REPORT, supra note 5, at MIT20-
900-903.
In many countries, 'private networks' are not really pri-
vate in the sense of users owning the cables and other me-
dia that are used to physically construct the network.
Even in the few countries where organizations have the
right to lay their own telephone cables, few organizations
actually do so since the investment required to dig up
roads and install trunk cables is much too high. Usually a
private network is built up using lines and other telecom-
munications facilities that are owned by very large tele-
communications companies and are rented or leased by
the user.
ate, receive and process corporate communications
traffic (i.e., telephones, computers, faxes and
modems); (2) PBXs, or on-premise switches, that in-
ternally switch corporate communications traffic;"2
(3) access lines, or circuits that link a corporation's
PBXs to the PSTN;aa and (4) leased lines (also
called private lines, PBX lines, and tie-lines) that
are the physical circuits leased from a carrier and
used to inter-link a corporation's remote PBXs."4 By
cobbling together these four discrete elements, corpo-
rations, in one fashion or another, establish private
corporate networks.
Networks that are to some degree owned, oper-
ated, and managed by third-party network service
providers (i.e., outsourcers) are oftentimes denomi-
nated as "outsourced" corporate networks. There are
basically three types of "outsourced" networks: (1)
facilities management ("FM"); (2) managed net-
work services ("MNS"); 8 and (3) telecommunica-
a' STALLINGS, supra note 27, at 322.
82 See PETER W. HUBER, ET AL., THE GEODESIC NETWORK
II - 1993 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE IN-
DUSTRY § 6.45 (1992), noting that a PBX
is [a] small local telephone office - a private switching sys-
tem located at the customer's premises. It serves exten-
sions in a business complex, campus, government agency,
or apartment building. It may operate as a stand-alone
switching hub, or remote switching node on a private net-
work comprising several private switches and many pri-
vate lines. A PBX also provides interconnection with the
public local exchange. Other trunks will connect the PBX
to various other public or private switches: a long distance
carrier, perhaps, or another PBX owned by the same bus-
iness at some different location. From the user's perspec-
tive, identical services are provided by network-based ser-
vices such as Centrex, offered by local telcos.
Id.
88 Since it is not feasible for a corporate network to provide
ubiquitous coverage, it has to at some point connect with the
PSTN. This interconnection occurs between a corporate network
termination point (PBX) and a public network termination
point (local loop). The access line itself can be either a leased
line, dial-up line or a cellular link. See generally NTIA INFRA-
STRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 3, at 150-51.
84 See THE MARKET FOR LEASED CIRCUITS IN WESTERN
EUROPE, CIT RESEARCH ANALYSIS, EUROPEAN COMMUNICA-
TIONS NEWSFILE 7 (1994) [hereinafter CIT RESEARCH
REPORT].
Leased lines are used by businesses to establish permanent
links between offices located in different cities or coun-
tries. A leased line solution is often sought on routes
which experience high traffic levels in order to escape the
usage dependent costs associated with public switched ser-
vices. Leased data circuits can also provide higher speeds
and more secure data communications than those offered
by public switched data services.
Id.
88 A MNS provider typically builds an international net-
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tions outsourcing ("TO").8" The principal difference
between these categories is the extent to which the
outsourcer owns and controls the four basic elements
of a corporation's network." For instance, with FM
and MNS, the outsourcer has little control over a
corporation's network facilities. Whereas, with TO
there is a great deal of facilities control exercised by
the outsourcer." The principal benefits of out-
sourced networks include: (1) the benefit of allowing
a corporation to concentrate on its core business; (2)
the cost-saving benefits realized because an out-
sourcer can exploit economies of scale and, therefore,
pass on efficiencies to the corporation; and (3) the
benefit of interfacing with a single point of contact
(i.e., "one stop shopping") with the outsourcer when
it comes to service provisioning, billing, and
maintenance. 9
Networks that are to some degree owned, oper-
ated, and managed by public telephone companies
are also denominated as outsourced networks, but
more often they are categorized by the type of corpo-
rate network service provided by the public tele-
phone companies. The most common network ser-
vices provided are: (1) PDNs; (2) Centrex; and (3)
Virtual Private Networks ("VPNs"). PDNs are
packet-switched data networks based on public facil-
ities that provide data switching and transmission ca-
pabilities to the general public. In effect, they are
work using leased lines and then resells capacity and service ap-
plications to companies. See id. at 9.
16 See Martin Davies, VANs Markets Europe, Telecoms
Outsourcing, OVUM LTD, Sept. 1993, at F15.
37 Id.
88 Id.
39 Outsourcing becomes a particularly attractive option to
in-house corporate networking at the international level. At the
international level, one has to deal with several operators around
the world and has to then reconcile the various technical stan-
dards not to mention the various ways of doing business. More-
over, paying bills can also be a nightmare. Finally, the differing
regulatory environment often forestalls transparent and fully
functional services across an entire network. However, an out-
sourcer can take care of most of these problems and can provide
the corporate user with the very attractive option of "one-stop
shopping." See id.
40 STALLINGS, supra note 27, at 345-46.
A public packet-switching network works much like a
public telephone network. In this case, the network pro-
vides a packet transmission service to a variety of sub-
scribers. Typically, the network provider owns a set of
packet-switching nodes and links these together with
leased lines . . . such a network is called a value added
network (VAN), reflecting the fact that the network adds
value to the underlying transmission facilities. In most
countries other than the United States, there is a single
public network owned or controlled by the government
value-added networks ("VANs"), but they differ
from VANs because they are provided by PTOs
rather than third-party operators.4
Centrex services are similar to PDNs except that
rather than providing data switching and transmis-
sion capabilities to the public, they provide voice te-
lephony switching and transmission capabilities."1
Functionally, Centrex services provide corporations
and CUGs with PBX-like capability and functional-
ity by using public exchanges. The obvious advan-
tage of Centrex is that corporations and CUGs do
not have to purchase or lease expensive on-premise
PBXs. The major disadvantage is that the corpora-
tion must rely on public exchanges for the switching
of critical corporate or CUG traffic. Because public
exchanges are less secure, problems arise if a corpo-
ration needs secure communications. Moreover, be-
cause public exchanges are not dedicated like PBXs,
there are risks that corporate traffic will be held up
because of public exchange congestion or downtime.
VPN services are higher level Centrex services
that, thanks to the infusion of digital technology and
intelligence in the VPN provider's network, provide
corporations and CUGs with the advantage of on-
demand bandwidth provisioning and the capability
of integrated data and voice communications."' As
with Centrex services, VPN services obviate the need
to purchase or lease expensive on-premise PBXs.
and referred to as a public data network (PDN).
Id.
,' See Noel Magee, The European Drive for Open PABX
Networking, Remarks at IPNS Forum (Sept. 30, - Oct. 1, 1991)
[hereinafter Amsterdam Conference Paper]. "A [c]entrex net-
work consists of equipment owned'and maintained by the PTO
on behalf of the customer. Only the terminals may be owned by
the customer. All the transmission and call control parts of the
network are owned by the PTO." Id.; Doug Jones, Moving on
to Centrex, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, June 1994, at 37. In addi-
tion, a "[c]entrex is ... a network service that gives businesses
all the facilities otherwise available from sophisticated private
branch exchange [PBX] systems." Id.
"1 Id. VPNs come in two basic varieties: the first can be de-
scribed as a sophisticated Centrex network used by corporations
requiring communications coverage over a large geographic area.
The second, is where a corporation's PBXs are interconnected
by non-dedicated private (virtual) circuits. These circuits are vir-
tual because they do not involve the installation of physical links.
There are two ways this can be achieved: (1) the overlay scena-
rio where a TO does not handle the call control signalling be-
tween a corporation's PBXs, but rather, the PBXs themselves
establish the transmission channel through the TO's network;
and (2) the integrated scenario where the TO interacts with the
signalling in the corporation's network and establishes a connec-
tion on-demand by the PBX. In the second scenario, the PBX
cannot distinguish between a private and a virtually private cir-
cuit because there is only a single stage call set-up. Id.
[Vol. 4
CORPORATE NETWORKING - EUROPEAN UNION
However, with VPNs there is the added advantage
of on-demand bandwidth, which means that a VPN
operator simply allocates a virtual circuit with
software over its network to a customer and dedi-
cates that circuit for as long as the customer needs
it.4' This capability effectively provides a user with a
circuit that is functionally equivalent to a leased line,
but unlike a leased line it does not have to be physi-
cally installed." This capability also affords corpora-
tions the ability to reconfigure their networks to meet
changing business demands (e.g., if a new office is
set up, a virtual circuit can be requested and allo-
cated almost instantaneously)."' Other advantages of
VPNs over private corporate networks include:"' (1)
increased network redundancy (VPNs can be used to
backup a private network during downtime or con-
gestion); (2) the benefits of usage-based tariffs
(leased lines are typically tariffed at fixed periodic
rates which means a corporation may be paying for
unused bandwidth);4' (3) cost savings resulting from
a VPN provider's ability to exploit economies of
scale;"' (4) lower capital costs and outlay because a
corporation does not need to purchase PBXs and
maintain expensive in-house staffs; and (5) feature
transparency. 9
48 Virtual Private Networks, OVUM LTD, Feb. 1994, at F1-
1 [hereinafter VPN Report].
"' A VPN can provide a customizing dialing plan just as a
private network can. For example, a corporate user wanting to
call a foreign subsidiary does not need to dial the full 14 digits to
reach the subsidiary if it is linked by a VPN all that is needed is
the four to five digit number provided in the dialing plan. See id.
48 See Virtual Networking, ELECTRONICS AND COMM. ENG.
J., June 1994, at 152.
4e Id.; DATAPRO VPN REPORT, supra note 5, at MIT20-
900-903, 904 (VPNs support the following corporate services:
(1) global digit desk-to-desk dialing plans; (2) abbreviated and
flexible dialing; (3) integrated billing and billing by department;
(4) logging call details; (5) calling line ID; (6) caller screening;
and (7) call forwarding).
"' With VPNs, a corporation pays only for the capacity
used. With private networks based on leased lines and PBXs, a
corporation may be paying for spare capacity. Alison Classe,
UK: Getting Connected-Virtual Private Networks, COMPUTER
WKLY., June 1, 1995; see also Marc Beishon, The Virtual Pri-
vate Network Arrives in Europe, NETWORK EUR., Nov. 1994, at
13. "The VPN is typically more cost-effective than a private
network if the traffic is less than 2000 minutes a day." Id.
,' See OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 102. Because the
VPN provider can provide services to many customers over the
same backbone network, (i.e., the sharing of facilities) the VPN
provider can spread its costs across many customers. Moreover,
cost savings can be realized because corporations can concentrate
on core activities. Id.
II. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VARIOUS
CATEGORIES OF CORPORATE NETWORKS
A. Private Corporate Voice Networks - PBX net-
works
Although primitive variations of private corporate
voice networks first emerged during the turn of the
century, their modern day equivalents did not sur-
face until the late 1950s. 0 Prior to this time, the
proliferation of private corporate voice networks was
stanched by prohibitive regulations in many coun-
tries. Most of the regulations were justified on the
erstwhile belief that the telecommunications sector
was a "natural monopoly," and therefore duplicative
networks, such as private voice networks, were not
economically optimal and should not be built.5 1
However, this belief was dislodged when advances in
communications technology during the late 1950s,
particularly in the areas of microwave, satellite, and
radio, established the economic viability and desira-
bility of building duplicative private networks. In the
United States, this prompted the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC") to elaborate, over a
number of years, a regulatory environment that
sought to promote the establishment of private net-
works.52 However, this did not prompt regulatory
49 VPN Report, supra note 43, at F1-2. Feature trans-
parency is "possible because the VPN switches can enable oper-
ation from a central point, whereas in conventional private net-
works this facility is provided by the terminating equipment on
the periphery of the network." Id.
80 See NOAM, supra note 19, at 70. "[I]n 1882, [the German
PTT] established conditions of private interconnection with the
public network. Ten years later there were more than 2000 pri-
vate lines connecting with the public system, and almost 3000
purely private telephone systems within private properties such
as factories." Id.
8 See id. at 57; see also OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at
135. Since the late 1950s, advances in technology have begun to
erode the validity of this theory. Id.
52 Particularly instrumental in fostering corporate network-
ing in the United States have been the following FCC decisions:
In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands above 890 Mc.,
Report and Order, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959) (allowing the use of
certain microwave frequencies for private point-to-point commu-
nications systems), recon. denied, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960); In re
Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc. for Const.
Permits, Decision, 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969) (allowing MCI to
establish a point-to-point link-up between Chicago and St. Louis
to meet the inter-office and inter-plant communication needs of
small businesses), afld on recon., 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970); In
Re Establishment of Policies and Procedures, Specialized Com-
mon Carrier Services, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870
(1971) [hereinafter Specialized Common Carrier Or-
der](allowing new carriers to provide alternatives to interstate
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authorities in Europe to formulate and establish a
similar regulatory environment until the late 1980s
and early 1990s.
On the international level, prior to the 1950s, the
same regulations that inhibited the establishment of
national private networks also inhibited the estab-
lishment of international private networks. More-
over, because telecommunications initially developed
at the national level, arrangements were not really in
place between PTOs to support such communication
needs. However, this began to change when the post
World War II push toward global markets created a
need for corporations and CUGs to communicate at
the international level. This provided the impetus for
corporations and CUGs to demand concessions from
national governments to allow them to establish pri-
vate networks to meet these needs. The first such
concessions were awarded to international CUGs
such as Reuters and SITA (followed later by
SWIFT), allowing these first CUGs to establish pri-
vate leased-line networks that conveyed third-party
traffic."3 Multinational corporations had to wait
longer for the same concessions, and when they re-
ceived these concessions they were burdened by re-
strictions on third-party voice traffic. 5 ' That is, they
were typically restricted to building data networks
for the conveyance of intra-company traffic and for
the most part their networks could not interconnect
with the PSTN.
5 6
By the late 1970s, further advances in technology
and heightened global competition led multinational
corporations and CUGs to demand more concessions
transmission services), aff'd on recon., 31 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1971),
aff'd sub. nom. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm. v. FCC,
513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836
(1975); In re the Application of Packet Communications, Inc.
for Authority Under Section 214(a) of the Communications Act,
Memorandum Opinion, Order and Certificate, 43 F.C.C. 922
(1973)(allowing interstate packet-switched communication net-
works to resell data processing capacity over private leased
lines); In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared
Use of Common Carrier Services and Facilities, Report and Or-
der, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976)(allowing unlimited resale and
shared use of private line services), recon., 62 F.C.C.2d 588
(1977), afld sub nom. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
5a See, e.g., Barry McAdam, International Resale - Threat
or Opportunity, 1993 SINGLE MARKET COMM. REV., Spring
1993, at 38; see DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note 3, at
ix (Reuters is a news gathering organization that operates the
world's largest private network. SWIFT is a consortium owned
by over 2,200 banks worldwide that operates a global network
spanning over 200 countries); see also SITA, INTRODUCTION TO
SITA (1993). SITA is a consortium owned by 550 of the
world's airlines that operates a global network. It provides X.25
services to 40,000 users connections in over 210 countries. Id.
from national governments." Corporations and
CUGs received such concessions in the United States
and United Kingdom when the early 1980s harkened
in a wave of deregulation in both countries.57 As for
the rest of Europe, such concessions did not come in
earnest until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Conse-
quently, while corporations were building private
networks in the United States and the United King-
dom throughout the 1980s, corporations in Europe
were forced to rely on public "dial up" services to
meet their internal communications needs.8 How-
ever, as international economic realities set in, not
only were individual Member States lifting barriers
to private networking, but the EU was formulating
legislation to ease the pan-European barriers to pri-
vate voice networking.
59
B. Corporate Data Networks - LANs and WANs
The proliferation of corporate data networks be-
gan in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the intro-
duction of computer technology." As with private
voice networks, the proliferation of private data net-
works was initially hindered by regulations adopted
at a time when the concept of the natural monopoly
was still tenable.6 However, unlike the situation
with voice networks, corporations and third-party
service providers quickly obtained concessions from
the national government to build private data net-
works. Concessions came more easily because data
networks were not viewed as duplicative of the tradi-
84 McAdam, supra note 53, at 38.
55 Id. (noting that regulations limited multinational corpora-
tions to establishing private networks that inter-linked the par-
ent company with 51 percent or more owned subsidiaries).
56 Id.
51 See NOAM, supra note 19, at 115 (noting that UK dereg-
ulation began with the adoption of the UK Telecommunications
Act of 1981 and was further progressed with the 1984 privatiza-
tion of British Telecom). Approximately a decade later, follow-
ing the duopoly review in 1993, the UK introduced basic voice
and network infrastructure competition. In fact, today corpora-
tions wishing to build private networks can lease circuits from
the likes of British Rail and British Post Office who resell capac-
ity over their private networks. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra
note 6, at 49-51.
88 See Valiant & Rosenburg, supra note 2, at 28 (discussing
the proportion of data and voice traffic carried over private net-
works in Europe).
89 Id.
60 STALLINGS, supra note 27, at 767. "In the late 1960s,
there was an increasing use of centralized mainframe computers
with distributed terminals and increasing use of the telecommu-
nications network for data transmission." Id.
" McAdam, supra note 53, at 38.
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tional PSTN, since the traditional PSTN was
designed to convey analogue voice traffic and not dig-
ital data traffic. In the United States, this distinction
prompted the FCC to initiate a series of "computer
inquiries.""2 In the first inquiry, the pivotal 1971
Computer Inquiry I, the FCC granted an important
concession by deciding to not regulate the data
processing sector. This decision subsequently marked
the beginning of remote time sharing bureaus, the
precursors to today's VAN providers."
In Europe, the proliferation of private data net-
works did not begin in earnest until the mid-to late
1980s because, unlike the United States, the data
processing sector was largely a regulated monop-
oly. 4 That is, in most European countries, PTOs
held "exclusive rights" over the provision of data
services to the public, which effectively forestalled
the deployment of private data networks well into
the 1980s. During this time, the PTOs were notori-
ous for providing poor and inadequate data ser-
vices. 6 Concurrently, an explosive growth in data
traffic and global competition produced new de-
mands for competitive data communications ser-
vices.66 This prompted a bevy of European countries
to loosen the stranglehold over data communica-
tions.67 For instance, the United Kingdom liberalized
its VAN market in 1981, followed by Denmark in
1988, and Germany and the Netherlands in 1989.68
"i Id.; In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations, 64 F.C.C.2d 771 (1977).
"a A VAN is a privately owned packet switched network
upon which a service provider provides data processing services
to the public. Typically, a VAN service provider owns a set of
packet switching nodes and then links the nodes with circuits
leased from PTOs. See STALLINGS, supra note 27, at 345. VAN
services include voice mail, e-mail, video conferencing, caller ID
and electronic data interexchange. See NOAM, supra note 19, at
373-77.
" See, e.g., Susan Fitzgerald, International Networks, The
US. Infrastructure for ISDN Has Been In Place For Years But
Europe Leads the Way in Implementation, Global Warming:
ISDN Heats Up, LAN MAC., June 1994, at 50.
" PTOs traditionally supported corporate data traffic over
PDNs that were based on packet-switching transmission tech-
nology which is ill-suited for the conveyance of high-bit rate data
traffic. See NOAM, supra note 19, at 370; Lee Elaine Williams,
Europe's Telecom Markets are Opening Up for Business, ELEc-
TRONIC Bus., Jan. 22, 1990.
" Id. (noting a forty fold increase in data traffic between
1970-1985); The 1995 Data Comm Market Forecast, DATA
COMM., Dec. 1994, at 71.
e NOAM, supra note 19, at 369.
u See id. at 115; see, e.g., MICHEL CARPENTIER ET AL.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION 126-34 (1992).
"' Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on
Competition in the Markets for Telecommunications Services,
At the Pan-EU level, the adoption of the 1990 Ser-
vices Directive69 then consolidated this process of lib-
eralization." As a result, private networks are now
proliferating at an increasing rate in Europe, and
VAN services are growing accordingly."
C. Integrated Networks - ISDN
Integrated networks in both the private and public
domain were developed during the 1970s when ad-
vances in digital technology made possible the digital
integration of various types of communications traf-
fic. While deployment in the United States of inte-
grated networks in the pubic domain has led users to
migrate voice traffic from private networks to public
backbone networks (e.g., Integrated Services Digital
Networks ("ISDN")), in Europe a long monopoly
tradition has led users to do quite the opposite. That
is, to migrate voice traffic from public networks to
private networks.7 Interestingly, when PTOs devel-
oped a standard integrated network for the public
domain, i.e., the ISDN during the 1970s and 1980s,
their original aim was to draw users back to the
public network."8 Indeed, the ability of ISDN to
support voice, data, and video traffic in digitized
form was suppose to stave off the threat of bypass
created by private networks . 7  However, as men-
tioned above, ongoing liberalization and user dissat-
1990 O.J. (L 192) 10 [hereinafter 1990 Services Directive],
amended by Commission Directive 94/46/EC on the Liberalisa-
tion of Satellite Terminals and Services, 1994 O.J. (L 268) 15.
70 See generally id.
71 See The Total European VANs Market, OVUM LTD,
Apr. 1993, at M11-1 (noting that the European VANs market
has been experiencing an average growth rate of 24% since
1991).
71 See Users Point to Big Changes in European Networks,
DATA COMM., Sept. 1994, at 63 (discussing the trend in Europe
to migrate voice traffic onto private data networks, and the trend
in the United States for companies to shift voice traffic off their
private networks onto VPNs); see also Valiant & Rosenburg,
supra note 2, at 28.
7' The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT), during the 1980-84 Study Group XVIII,
defined ISDN as "a network, evolved from the telephony net-
work, that provides end-to-end digital connectivity to support a
wide range of services, including voice and non-voice, to which
users have access by a limited set of standard multipurpose in-
terfaces." INTUG: An International User View of ISDN, 1993
SINGLE MARKET COMM. REV., Spring 1993, at 64.
7' Heywood & McMaster, supra note 7, at 70. "PTTs will
be bidding aggressively for more corporate business . . . rolling
out new services such as ISDN, which may actually eliminate
the need for PBXs over the long term. And virtual private net-
works (VPNs) from the PTTs will even blur the conventional
distinctions between public and private networks." Id. See
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isfaction with PTO practice is making private
networking outsourcing and VPNs much more via-
ble in Europe. Additionally, user disaffectation with
the PTOs in the past has prompted some corpora-
tions in Europe to migrate voice traffic onto private
networks.75
At the same time, Europe currently leads the
United States in ISDN deployment and user take-
up.7" ISDN take-up in Europe is more advanced
than in the United States because, until recently, pri-
vate networks were not a viable option in Europe as
a result of prohibitive leased lines tariffs.7 7 Thus,
corporations in Europe that have not been able to
afford private networks have found ISDN corporate
networks to be the only viable option. Other corpo-
rations have found that hybrid solutions can be ad-
vantageous. 78 These corporations are using ISDN
for certain applications, usually non-mission critical,
and private networks for other more critical applica-
tions. Indeed, one could probably discern a trend
towards hybrid solutions, both in Europe and the
United States.80
Communications from the Commission Related to the Develop-
ment of the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) as a
Trans-European Network, COM(93)347 final at Annex A
[hereinafter 1993 ISDN Communication].
71 Outsourcing Spending To Quadruple Over Next 10
Years, FIN. TIMES TELECOM MARKETS, Mar. 30, 1995, at 14
noting that:
the proportion spent on insourced telecommunications ser-
vices (self-provided private circuits) will fall from 35 per
cent to 19 per cent. But the proportion spent on virtual
private networks (VPNs) will increase from 16 per cent to
19 per cent, and the share going to outsourced services
will increase from 11 per cent to 27 per cent.
ld.
l7 Arthur D. Little Report, supra note 4, at 18; Fitzgerald,
supra note 64, at 50.
" For example, France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom
have historically overpriced leased lines in an effort to lure busi-
ness customers to their public ISDN networks. NOAM, supra
note 19, at 360-66.
78 Heywood & McMaster, supra note 7, at 70. In Europe,
"PBXs also are linked to ISDNs via primary-rate interfaces
(PRIs), which . . . consist of 30 B channels for user traffic and a
D channel for signaling between the PBX and the public
switch." Id.
" Paul Easto, Where to Dial Up Leased Lines, TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS, July 1994, at 23-24, noting that:
The decision whether to use ISDN or leased lines depends
on costs, which in turn depends on how much bandwidth
is wanted, for how long and for how often. Leased lines
are best used to support the steady-state traffic require-
ment as measured for the period over which leased lines
D. Outsourced Networks - VAN Providers
As mentioned above, where VANs began prolifer-
ating in the United States in the 1960s, they only
began proliferating in Europe during the 1980s.
Similarly, whereas outsourcing has been experienc-
ing strong growth for years in the United States, it is
only now coming of age in Europe. During the
1980s, save for the United Kingdom,81 the European
outsourcing market was dominated by the PTOs. 2
User dissatisfaction with PTO services then created
the impetus for the adoption of measures opening up
the sector to competition, initially at the Member
State level and later at the pan-EU level."' Five
years after the adoption of the 1990 Service Direc-
tive, " and the ONP Framework Directive,3 the Eu-
ropean outsourcing market is beginning to bur-
geon."' Although estimates vary widely, the market
is valued at approximately 2.2 billion dollars,8 7 with
future growth expected to average fifteen to twenty
percent per annum.88
E. Outsourcing by PTOs - VPNs
Centrex services that were introduced in the 1960s
are tariffed: annually. ISDN is best suited for providing
bandwidth to recover from leased line failure, node failure
by routing to a different node, augmenting the bandwidth
provided by the leased line, or for applications where
there is no steady state.
Id.; see, e.g., Nuri Dagdeviren et al., Global Networking With
ISDN, IEEE COMM. MAG., June 1994, at 26, 29.
80 STALLINGS, supra note 27, at 323 (noting that "[wJith the
use of digital technology, a private network can support both
data devices and telephones").
81 See NOAM, supra note 19, at 372 (noting that in Europe,
liberalization in the VAN market first took place in the UK).
82 Id. at 144. For example, prior to 1990 in France, VAN
providers were limited to a single connection to the PSTN. Id.
"' See Williams, supra note 65, at 57. "European businesses
are thirsty for the data and value-added services that were previ-
ously tied to PTTs, often at monopolistic prices more than 80%
higher than in the United States." Id.
84 1990 Services Directive, supra note 69, at 10.
88 Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the
Establishment of the Internal Market for Telecommunications
Services Through the Implementation of Open Network Provi-
sion, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 1 [hereinafter ONP Framework
Directive].
" See CIT RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 34, at 8. "In
public switched data communications, the erosion of monopoly
provision started in Europe in the 1980s with the introduction of
value added network services." Id.
87 See Outsourcing Spending to Quadruple Over Next Ten
Years, supra note 74, at 13-14.
88 Id.
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in the United States and Europe have recently been
largely supplanted by VPNs. VPNs were first intro-
duced in the United States by AT&T, Sprint and
MCI following deregulation in 1984.89 Their intro-
duction into the American market has been instru-
mental in bringing down long-distance tariffs.90
Moreover, after a decade in the market, providers of
VPNs in the United States have managed to attract
a major portion of corporate voice traffic onto their
networks and away from private networks. 91 Al-
though VPNs can support data traffic, American
corporations have been less inclined to outsource
data for purposes of security." As a consequence, it
is now becoming commonplace for corporations in
the United States to employ both VPNs and private
networks; in essence, hybrid networks that optimally
support voice and data traffic.93
Although VPNs were introduced in Europe years
before they were introduced in the United States
(France Telecom introduced the first VPNs in
1975), deployment and take-up has been rather lack-
luster as a result of regulatory barriers.9 4 For exam-
ple, where ninety percent of American based corpo-
rations use VPNs, only sixteen percent of EU based
corporations are currently using such VPNs." At
the pan-EU level, market and regulatory disparities
have further forestalled VPN takeup. However,
more recently, following the 1990 Services and ONP
81 DATAPRO VPN REPORT, supra note 5, at MIT20-900-
905 (noting that VPN voice services have gained wide accept-
ance in the US); Classe, supra note 47 (noting that "the market
for telephony VPNs is pretty well saturated . . . [in the United
States it is estimated] that as many as 90% of the Fortune 500
companies are using VPN.").
9 See Beishon, supra note 47, at 13.
*' See OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 57.
" See Classe, supra note 47. "Most VPN activity in the US
to date has proved to be in the voice telephony area.., although
the same VPN facilities are also used for switched data." Id.
Valiant & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 28 (noting that
"[clompanies remain reluctant to entrust their data to a virtual
network."); DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note 3, at 29
(noting that "[iln the US, many users are now using their leased
lines for data only, having migrated their voice traffic to VPN
and switched network services in response to recently introduced
attractive tariff packages for bulk users.").
o NOAM, supra note 19, at 51.
9 DATAPRO VPN REPORT, supra note 5, at MIT20-900-
902. See also Jennifer L. Schenker, IVPNs Promise the World,
But Deliver Only a Small Piece, COMM. WK. INT'L, Nov. 28,
1994, at 27.
"' Concert Gets Green Light in the US, EXCHANGE, Nov.
11, 1994.
See Beishon, supra note 47, at 13.
Joia Shillingford, Survey of Technology in the Office,
Framework Directives, international alliances have
been formed aimed at providing pan-EU VPNs." In
addition, most PTOs have now established, or are
planning to establish, both domestic and national
VPNs. 97 Consequently, it can be said that the preex-
isting barriers in Europe to VPNs are progressively
being removed.93
F. Hybrid Networks
As mentioned above, some large corporate users
deploy hybrid networks that combine private
("leased line") networks with outsourced ("ISDN"/
"VPN") networks. Such corporations typically use
leased line networks where constancy and redun-
dancy are important and where usage can be opti-
mized.99 They outsource networks or use ISDN con-
nections to back-up leased line networks in case of
local system failure, for all other less-critical traffic,
or for overflow control during periods of peak utili-
zation."0 ISDN is well-suited for such hybrid ar-
rangements because the ISDN can easily be accessed
by existing switched networks or dedicated lines.101
In short, the inherent benefits of both private net-
works and ISDN has become an attractive option for
some corporate users.
FIN. TiMES, Oct. 26, 1993, at II. "In the US, the market for
VPNs is worth several billion dollars and has helped to take
traffic off private networks and give it back to the telecoms carri-
ers." Id.
91 See DATAPRO VPN REPORT, supra note 5, at MIT20-
900-901. "In Europe, few domestic VPNs exist, and regulatory
constraints prevent third party providers from offering voice ser-
vices in competition with the local PTT." Id.
" VPN Report, supra note 43, at F1-2; Classe, supra note
47. "[Siome U.S. users of VPNs operate 'hybrid' networks, re-
taining elements of their own private networks, especially on
their heaviest traffic routes." Id.
100 Weisman, supra note 2, at 353.
101 VPN Report, supra note 43, at F1-2; Kimberly Patch &
Mary Johnston-Turner, A Fresh Outlook on Outsourcing;
Users Find Farming Out Pieces of the Network Operations Pie
Has Its Benefits, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 22, 1993, at 38, not-
ing that:
a company might outsource data center operations and ap-
plications support modules to a systems integrator, wide-
area network modules such as the operation and manage-
ment of modems, multiplexers and private branch ex-
changes to a carrier, and local-area network and client/




III. HISTORICAL, CONTEMPORARY AND
FUTURE BARRIERS TO PRIVATE
NETWORKING IN THE EU
Many of the historical barriers to corporate
networking have been dismantled in the last few
years as a result of directives and policies adopted by
the EU. As mentioned above, particularly instru-
mental in this process have been the 1990 Services
and ONP Framework Directives. Nevertheless, a
long legacy of monopoly telecommunications and a
fragmented market coupled with the exclusive rights
PTOs will continue to exercise over network infra-
structure and basic voice telephony until at least
January 1, 1998 mean that barriers to corporate
networking in the EU will persist in the coming
years. 0 2 In 1993, the United States Office of Tech-
nology Assessment summarized some of the persist-
ing barriers to private networking in Europe as
follows:
American firms operating in Europe feel seriously ham-
pered by the necessity of relying on European technology
and services for communications within Europe ....
Many of them complain of the scarcity of high-grade
leased lines, restrictions on the use of all leased lines, lack
of access to fast data networks, severe restrictions on - or
delays in - approving customer-premises equipment, ir-
regular and inconsistent billings, and above all, excessively
high costs.'
Most of these barriers result when PTOs abuse
102 The Green Paper on the Liberalization of Telecommuni-
cations Infrastructure and Cable T.V. Networks, Part II, A
Common Approach to a Provision of Infrastructure for Tele-
communications in the European Union, COM(94)682 final at I
[hereinafter Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part II] (noting that
the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure remained
the single most important step to be taken in the context of Eu-
ropean telecommunications policy); see Virtual Networking,
supra note 45, at 152. "In Europe ... there are many obstacles;
for example, incompatible technical standards, telco (telecommu-
nications company) resistance and fragmentation due to the
number of different countries involved." Id.; see also Eric Smal-
Icy, Networking Abroad: Europeans are facing Some of the
Same Multiprotocol Networking Issues that Confront Users in
the U.S., LAN COMPUTING, Jan. 1993, at 19 (noting that as a
result of the various available services and differing standards
and prices, achieving Europe-wide telecommunications networks
remains a challenge, and PTT monopolies have stifled private
networks in Europe by reducing the availability and raising the
price of leased circuits).
108 OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
10 See Analysys Ltd., Open Network Provision Applied to
the Local Loop, Final Report for CEC DGXIII, at 103 (Nov.
1993) [hereinafter Analysys Report]. An "[e]xamination of TO
financial data indicated that 53% of telephony revenues are from
business customers." Id.
their monopoly power in order to discourage private
networks from being established. Of course, PTOs
have an incentive to forestall the establishment of
private networks because private networks bypass
their networks and services, and as such deprive
them of significant revenues. Moreover, PTOs have
an incentive to forestall competitors from setting up
private networks because competitors have the ability
to "cream skim" lucrative corporate business from
the PTOs, while not having to similarly contribute
to meet universal service goals."° The following is a
short review of the barriers that result from PTO
monopoly abuse and the barriers that result from
Europe's mosaic telecommunications market.
A. Barriers Resulting From Monopoly Control
1. Network Infrastructure (i.e., Leased Lines) 0 5
Apart from Finland, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, PTOs in the remaining Member States of
the EU hold exclusive rights over the provision of
public network infrastructure.'0 According to the
European Commission, this monopoly environment
has led to:
high tariffs for and lack of availability of the basic infra-
structure over which such liberalised services are operated
or provided to third parties [which has] delayed the wide-
spread development of high speed corporate networks in
Europe ... 107
105 In the United States, competition in private line services
(leased lines) began in 1971 pursuant to the FCC's Specialized
Common Carrier Order, supra note 52, para. 1. In that Order,
the FCC gave MCI permission to build intercity microwave as
well as allowing other carriers to lease private lines for resale.
Id. This paved the way for competition in the market for private
network services; private line service is defined as a service that
consists of communication facilities linking two or more points
which is set aside for the exclusive use or availability of a partic-
ular customer and/or authorized users for a predetermined pe-
riod of time; see, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 22.2.
106 See NOAM, supra note 19, at 80. Exclusive rights over
network infrastructure has been the norm for the better part of
this century. For example, the Telecommunications Facilities
Law of 1928 gave the German PTT, or the Bundespost, permis-
sion to construct and operate telecommunications facilities.
There was an exception to the monopoly - for private services,
but only those facilities not crossing property lines or facilities
connecting the properties of a single owner. Id.
107 See Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part I, supra note 2,
at 12; see also Communications by the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council on the Status and Implementa-
tion of Directive 90/388/EEC on the Competition in the Mar-
kets for Telecommunications Services, COM(95)-., at 15
(released Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Services Status Re-
port]; see also Michael Rhodes, The Future of Services in Eu-
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In those Member States where network infra-
structure is under monopoly control, the prospect of
a corporation or third-party service provider estab-
lishing a private network is, for practical purposes,
unlikely, because the PTOs can and do make "dial-
up" solutions more attractive by overpricing and un-
dersupplying leased lines.108 Of course, this situation
is exacerbated in those Member States that do not
allow the use of alternative infrastructure for the
provision of leased lines.1" However, even though
the EU has not scheduled infrastructure liberaliza-
tion until January 1, 1998, competitive services al-
ready introduced by the 1990 Services Directive,
along with the introduction of international competi-
tion and new technologies, are beginning to whittle
away at the infrastructure monopoly enjoyed by the
PTO. As such, there is de facto hastening of the pro-
cess of network infrastructure liberalization in ad-
vance of the January 1, 1998 date. " 0
In the post-January 1, 1998 era, to what extent
mandated competition will lead to cost-oriented tar-
iffs and an adequate supply of high capacity leased
line will certainly depend on the level of dominance
the PTO will retain in the respective markets. Gag-
ing from experience with liberalization in the United
States and United Kingdom, experts believe that
PTOs will retain dominance for a number of years
after the January 1, 1998 date. 1 To what extent
they will retain dominance will, in large measure,
depend on how national governments deal with the
issue of competitive "cream skimming," ' 2 and its af-
rope, COMPUTER LAW AND PRACTICE (1994), at 111, 116 (not-
ing that in continental Europe, high-bandwidth services remain
constrained by limited availability of necessary transmission in-
frastructure in many areas, particularly corporate communica-
tions). The availability of leased lines is a prerequisite for the
establishment of value added services. See DTI INFRASTRUC-
TURE STUDY, supra note 3, at 71.
10 Heywood & McMaster, supra note 7, at 70 (noting that
"[iln many European countries where PTTs have discouraged
[the development of private networks] by charging exorbitant
rates for leased lines and imposing restrictions on third-party
traffic and interconnection").
109 See Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part I, supra note 2,
at 15 n.11. An "[a]lternative infrastructure is network infra-
structure owned by entities other than the telecommunications
organisations, and includes cable TV networks. Often such in-
frastructure concerns networks constructed originally to meet the
internal communication needs of national or regional utilities
(for example, gas, electricity and water companies, the railways
and the motorway concessionaires)." Id.
"0 See Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part II, supra note
102, at 14-22, n.32 (noting that "[piroposals are currently before
the Dutch Parliament to introduce competitive infrastructure
provision by the creation of a second national infrastructure pro-
vider."); NOAM, supra note 19, at 104, 115 (discussing network
fect on the provision of universal service. "
2. Member State Restrictions on the Use of Leased
Lines
In the past, Member States and PTOs have
placed unduly restrictive conditions on the use of
leased lines.11' Although these restrictions are now
slowly being removed, they still exist to varying de-
grees in some of the Member States. Some of the
more notable restrictions include: (1) restrictions
against the transmission of third-party traffic over
private ("leased-lines") based networks;"" (2) re-
strictions against interconnecting leased lines to the
PSTN; (3) restrictions against the direct intercon-
nection by leased lines of corporate sites in different
Member States; 1  and (4) restrictions against the
transmission of voice telephony over leased lines net-
works. 117 These restrictions, taken together, have, in
the past, eviscerated private networks of their utility
and effectiveness, and, as such, made public "dial
up" solutions more attractive.
3. Barriers Due to Extortionate Pricing of Leased
Lines
As compared with leased line prices in the United
States, leased lines in Europe can be tariffed at
prices ten to fourteen times those in the United
States, with price differentials for pan-EU lines (as
infrastructure liberalization in the U.K. in 1981 and 1984).
II See CIT RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 34, at 9. "We
expect only a few providers to challenge the dominance of the
incumbent PTO in the provision of simple leased capacity." Id.
112 PTOs argue that "cream skimming" would deprive them
of significant revenue necessary to provide universal service.
See, e.g., Analysys Report, supra note 104, at 70. "[Ulnder the
traditional monopoly model of telecommunications, tariff struc-
tures were influenced more by the political desire for network
expansion than by commercial requirement. This lead to a retail
tariff structure which in effect bought network expansion at the
expense of business customers." Id.
113 See DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note 3, at 14.
"Traditionally, Germany was extremely restrictive on the provi-
sion of leased lines, which were only available for data at pro-
hibitively high tariffs." Id.
114 See John M. Lusa, A Unified Europe Beckons Business,
NETWORKING MGMT., Apr. 1991, at 22.
118 See Heywood & McMaster, supra note 7, at 70.
116 See International Networks, NETWORK WORLD, Dec.
24, 1990, at 15 (discussing restrictions on direct interconnection
of leased lines).
II NOAM, supra note 19, at 145 (noting that in 1987,
France limited resale of leased line capacity to data services but
tariffs were set to prevent "cream skimming").
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compared to United States long distance leased lines)
being even greater. 18 Moreover, whereas in the
United States leased line tariffs are typically non-
traffic sensitive and relatively neutral in terms of
bandwidth pricing," 9 leased line tariffs in Europe
are often quite the opposite, i.e., traffic-sensitive and
premiums are often levied on digital lines.120
4. Low Supply of High-Speed Leased Lines
Whereas high-speed leased lines (i.e., 2Mbit/s
and above) are readily available at affordable rates
in the United States, they are in short supply and
prohibitively priced in Europe.' In today's highly
competitive world, corporations require such high-
speed leased lines in order to support traffic intensive
applications such as LAN-to-LAN interconnection,
video-conferencing, and other high-bit rate business
applications.' 22 As a direct consequence, European-
based corporations have been disadvantaged vis-a-vis
their United States counterparts, who, because of af-
fordable access to high capacity digital leased lines,
have implemented competitively advantageous busi-
ness applications.' s
The shortfall of high-capacity digital lines in Eu-
rope is rather stark. For instance, it is estimated that
118 See Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part I, supra note 2,
at 22, tbl. 3; see also Alan Cane, Phone Call Prices 'Lowest of
Main Industrial Nations,' FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at 7 (not-
ing that in Germany a typical business must pay four times as
much for leased line as its American counterpart); see DTI IN-
FRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note 3, at ix (noting that it was
also reported that the international news company, Reuters,
would realize 90% cost savings if its world-wide network was
based in the United States); see also Cane, supra note 19, at § 3-
1.
Analysys - a Cambridge, UK-based consultancy which
specialises in telecommunications costs-estimates the total
average cost per line in European Currency Units, for a
12-line business customers as Ecu2,456 for a customer of
Deutsche' Telekom, Ecu2,269 for a customer of France
Telecom but only Ecul,585 for a customer of Mercury
Communications in the U.K.
Id.
119 Compared with Europe, users in the United States (i.e.,
corporations and VAN providers) enjoy a proportionally low in-
crease in cost for high speed circuits. This, in effect, means that
users in the United States view bandwidth as an inexpensive
commodity, see, e.g., DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note
3, at ix; Analysys Report, supra note 104, at 13 (noting that in
the United States competition in the leased line sector has re-
sulted in lower costs, quicker installation times, greater variety
of services and improved maintenance and repair service).
120 Richard A. Kramer, Divisions in European Telecommu-
nications: EC Authority and the Illusion of Competition, COMM.
AND STRATEGIES, 3rd Quarter 1992, at 72.
... See Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part I, supra note 2,
only about ten to twenty percent of the overall Euro-
pean supply of leased lines consists of high-speed
digital leased lines. The rest of the supply consists of
low speed analogue lines.' 2 ' Interestingly, the United
Kingdom (a country with a liberalized network in-
frastructure sector) has eighty percent of the Euro-
pean supply of high-speed digital leased lines. 2
However, notwithstanding the current supply and
price differentials in leased lines in relation to the
United States, 2 1 in a European context, the 1990
ONP Framework and the 1992 Leased Lines Direc-
tive (see below) have undoubtedly resulted in a re-
duction in tariffs and overall growth in the supply of
2Mbit/s digital, leased lines, with current estimates
stating as much as fifty percent growth per
annum.'
27
5. Poor Servicing, Reliability, and Delayed Instal-
lation of Leased Lines
European PTOs have been notorious for delaying
the actual installation of physical leased lines.128 An-
ecdotal evidence from business users reveals that de-
lays in installations can extend from six weeks to six
months, to even a year or more, particularly when
at 21. "European corporate networking and competitive service
provisions ... depend critically on the availability of high-capac-
ity digital leased circuits operating at 2Mbit/s and above." Id.
122 Therefore, in order to realize effective interconnection
that interconnects two or more such LANs, high-speed leased
lines are required. Ron Biesaart, LAN Interconnection: ISDN
in its Own Right, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Oct. 1994, at 49.
128 See generally The Commission Opens Cable TV Net-
works to Liberalised Telecoms Services, I&T MAG., Winter
1994-95, at 3.
1I REGULATORY REFORM IN EU TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
THE ACHIEVEMENT, THE DIFFICULTIES AND THE PROSPECTS,
Directorate General XIII of the European Commission - Tele-
communications, Information Market and Exploitation on Re-
search, Overview, Spring 1994, at 4 [hereinafter DGXIII
OVERVIEW].
128 Id. France has 10% of the overall supply. Id.
ae Analysys Report, supra note 104, at 21 ("The total num-
ber of TI lines expected to be installed in the USA in 1992 was
100000 - 120000 lines. The equivalent number for the EC was
estimated to be around a fifth of this."). However, the European
supply of Tl-equivalent lines is experiencing strong growth. See
DGXIII OVERVIEW, supra note 124, at 4.
121 Id.
128 Communications to the Council and European Parlia-
ment on the Consultation on the Review of the Situation in the
Telecommunications Services Sector, COM(93)159 final at 5
(noting that the European Commission has identified as a bottle-
neck to telecommunications services the delays experienced when
requesting new networks and services, in particular intra-Euro-
pean high-speed lines).
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high-capacity lines are requested. 2 In fact, in cer-
tain instances, PTOs have simply refused to install
leased lines.18 The adoption of the ONP Leased
Lines Directive in 1992 has, however, begun to im-
prove this situation by requiring PTOs to meet cer-
tain predetermined supply conditions when supply-
ing leased lines to competitors and users.
6. Lack of Trans-Border Coordination in Relation
to One-Stop-Shopping, Billing and Trouble Shooting
Historically, and to some extent today, the provi-
sioning of leased lines in Europe has occurred at the
Member State level. As a consequence, few arrange-
ments have existed between PTOs for the provision-
ing and maintenance of pan-European leased lines.
This has meant that corporations have had to con-
tend with a myriad of PTOs and national authorities
when ordering leased lines for the establishment of
pan-European networks. This has also meant that
when leased lines fail, the lack of coordination be-
tween the PTOs oftentimes leaves the corporate user
with a handicapped network while the PTOs decide
whose responsibility it is to repair the leased line.
B. Barriers Arising from PTO Monopoly Control
Over Basic Voice Telephony
As with public network infrastructure, save for
Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, all
Member States in the EU still maintain national
monopolies over public voice telephony and will con-
'" Several European PTOs have until recently, been reluc-
tant to provide leased lines. DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY,
supra note 3, at 28; DATAPRO VPN REPORT, supra note 5, at
MIT20-900-903. "In some European markets, lead times as
long as five months are not uncommon when ordering some
leased circuits." Id.
180 For example, even following the adoption of the 1992
ONP Leased Lines Directive Telecom Italia, the Italian PTO,
in 1994 had refused to provide leased lines to a Milan based
company called Telesystem that was seeking to offer business
services such as high speed data transfer. Julian Bright, Europe
- Pulling Together, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 1995, at 10.
131 See DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note 3, at 8
(noting that in the United States, Japan, Sweden and U.K. there
are competing operators for long distance traffic); Liberalisation
by Hook or by Crook - By Agreement or By Article 90, NET-
WORK EUR., Mar. 1995, at 20.
133 See Zandleven, supra note 8, at 113 (noting for example,
in Germany, restrictions on switching voice traffic have pre-
vented companies from building private telephone networks); see
also 1995 Services Status Report, supra note 107.
133 See 1995 Services Status Report, supra note 107 (noting
that simple resale for voice is already allowed in the U.K, Swe-
tinue to do so until at least January 1, 1998.1' As a
result, voice telephony is, in large measure, dealt
with at the national level, with pan-EU telephony
services provided as international telephony rather
than domestic long-distance. This has kept pan-EU
telephony rates rather high. As a result, corporations
and CUGs are trying to establish private networks,
as allowed by the 1990 Services Directive, in order
to avoid these high rates. However, because pan-EU
telephony is a very lucrative market for PTOs, the
PTOs have been using their monopoly power to try
and limit the ability of these corporations and CUGs
to set up private networks. Ambiguities in the 1990
Services Directive as to the scope of the "voice te-
lephony" monopoly have provided PTOs with extra
leverage in forestalling the establishment of private
networks. 8 2 With voice telephony accounting for
eighty percent of overall PTO revenues, (and corpo-
rate users representing a majority of those revenues),
PTOs are expected to restrict the establishment of
private networks so long as their monopoly power
enables them to do so. However, their ability to do
so will continue to erode in the coming years as in-
ternational alternatives such as call-back, refile, and
calling card services begin to take root. The intro-
duction of "simple resale"' 3 after January 1, 1998,
of course, will further erode their monopoly
power." 4 Although barriers will persist, the ongoing
introduction of competition in the EU should remove
many of them as the January 1, 1998 deadline ap-
proaches and is passed.' As this occurs, long-dis-
tance competition in the EU should heat-up, and
"one-stop shopping" for pan-EU services should be-
den and the U.S.); see DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra
note 3, at 12 (noting that international simple resale refers to the
situation where a corporation interconnects the international
leased lines to the PSTN at both ends); see also OTA REPORT,
supra note 6, at 52.
134 Compared with the United States, where resale by
"switchless carriers" began in 1976. See In Re Regulatory Poli-
cies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier
Services and Facilities, Report and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 261
(1976), at'd sub nor American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572
F.2d 17 (2nd Cir. 1976). Unlimited resale of switched long-dis-
tance services began in 1980. See In Re MTS and WATS Mar-
ket Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice Of In-
quiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 81 F.C.C.2d 177 (1980). In
1985, firms were allowed to resell capacity on their private net-
works in direct competition with LECs and IXCs, while at the
same time not being subjected to regulatory obligations. See In
Re Fixed Microwave Radio Service, First Report and Order, 57
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1486 (1985).
... Richard Levine, Is the EC Telecom Market Catching
Up? The European Community; Industry Overview, FIN. Ex-
ECUTIVE, Sept. 1993, at 50.
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come increasingly commonplace.' 86
C. Absence of Centralized or Coordinated Licens-
ing at the Pan-European Level
Unlike the United States, which has a single regu-
latory body (the FCC) for purposes of licensing new
interstate service providers and users, in Europe, ser-
vice providers must obtain authorization and licenses
in each Member State in which they desire to pro-
vide services. This can obviously be expensive and
burdensome. In addition to this cumbersome process,
service providers and users must contend with re-
strictive national rules that limit the utility of private
networks.13 7 For example, in Germany the national
licensing authority in granting licenses for the con-
struction of private networks has limited such net-
works to areas within a twenty five kilometer cir-
cumference unless a showing was made that the
network could conform to certain predetermined
technical configurations. 8"
Although the establishment of a central EU licens-
ing authority is unlikely in the near future, the EU
Commission has helped to establish the European
Telecommunications Office ("ETO") to serve as a
clearinghouse for pan-European license applica-
tion."39 In particular, the ETO will accept applica-
tions for licenses in Member States and will under-
take to obtain approval on behalf of the applicant
from each relevant national licensing body.
D. Absence of Pan-European Standards for Net-
works/Services/Equipment
Because European telecommunications developed
at the national level,'4 corporations and service
providers seeking to establish pan-European private
1se See Zandleven, supra note 8, at 113 (noting that in the
past there was a "lack of cooperation among PTTs when it
comes to one-stop shopping, billing, and troubleshooting.").
187 NOAM, supra note 19, at 249. In Italy dedicated facilities
were "permitted only for services not provided by the public net-
work" and they existed, and still exist, "in a gray zone of tacit
agreement among large corporations." Id.
"a See Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part I, supra note 2,
at 17.
"I Dawn Hayes, EC to Gain Licensing Control, COMM.
WK. INT'L, July 5, 1993, at 35.
140 Fitzgerald, supra note 64, at 51. "Each country has im-
plemented its own network based on a variety of standards prior
to the establishment of standards throughout Europe." Id.
14 See Piero Ravaioli & Peter Sandler, The European
Union and Telecommunications: Recent Developments in the
Field of Competition (Part I), INT'L COMPUTER LAW., Apr.
networks have been faced with a host of differing
standards leading to problems of interoperability.' 4
This contrasts with the United States, which, as a
result of AT&T's preeminence over the national net-
work for more than a century, has inherited a
largely standardized, homogeneous, and interoper-
able national network. " "' Consequently, corporations
seeking to establish long-distance private networks in
the United States have enjoyed standardized offer-
ings while corporations in Europe have not had the
same luxury because of the disparate national net-
works and services offerings that still comprise the
pan-EU market." "
Although a pan-European regime is in place to
rectify the problems of standardization, this regime
has been plagued by delays.144 The delays in the
adoption of pan-EU standards means that corpora-
tions with pan-EU networks cannot diffuse certain
business applications in all Member States. 4"
Granted, the establishment of the European Tele-
communications Standards Institute ("ETSI") in
1987 was intended to change this state of affairs, and
has, to some extent, made significant inroads in the
European standardization process.
4 6
E. Lengthy Type-Approval Procedures
The type-approval process for terminal equipment
in Europe is largely administered at the national
level. Because the approval process differs in every
Member State, a company seeking to get approval
for, say, a new PBX, is faced with the daunting task
of sheparding approval applications in a myriad of
Member States. This has had the effect of driving up
the overall costs of terminal equipment which, in
turn, has diminished the attractiveness of establish-
ing private networks.14 7 This situation is exacerbated
1994, at 6.
14. Id. (i.e., up to 80% of the network and services are based
on AT&T standards).
14 See DATAPRO VPN REPORT, supra note 5, at MIT20-
900-904.
14 See Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part I, supra note 2,
at 24. "European telecommunications transmission infrastruc-
ture has evolved as a series of national geographical monopolies.
For customers with pan-European telecommunications require-
ments or for potential providers of pan-European services, this
has led to a patchwork of interconnected, but not fully interoper-
able transmission networks." Id.
148 Fitzgerald, supra note 64, at 51.
14 See generally JOHN HORROCKS, EUROPEAN GUIDE TO
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALISATION § 9 (1993).
147 See Paul Gannon, Regulating Europe's Fragmented
Market, NETWORK EUR., Sept. 1994, at 19 (discussing the
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by the complications that arise with the involvement
of numerous standards bodies in the type-approval
process and the undue influence exerted on these
bodies by PTOs." 8 As compared to the United
States, the EU type approvals process is long and ar-
duous." 9 This has caused the price of European ter-
minal equipment, such as PBXs, to be more expen-
sive than PBXs bought in the United States.15
Indeed, a recent report revealed that the delays and
administrative red tape associated with the European
type-approval process accounts for between four and
ten percent of the overall cost of terminal
equipment. 5
F. Interconnection
As mentioned, public network infrastructure and
services are monopolized by PTOs in Europe. As
such, European PTOs have had power, and have
used this power, to prevent competitive networks
from emerging and "cream skimming" lucrative cor-
porate business, while at the same time not contrib-
uting to meet universal service obligations. PTOs
have been able to abuse this power to their advan-
tage against those wishing to establish private net-
works by delaying the conclusion of necessary inter-
connection agreements. 5 ' Indeed, anecdotal accounts
indicate that PTOs can delay the consummation of
such agreements by up to one or two years. 5 ' This
situation, coupled with some persisting restrictions
on the interconnection of PBXs to the PSTN"5 and
restrictions on the conveyance of third-party traf-
standardization of terminal equipment); see Alex Hardisty &
Martin Harris, Harmonizing Leased Lines in Europe, TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS, July 1994, at 27-30 (discussing the stand-
ardization of leased lines in the EU).
148 See Amsterdam Conference Paper, supra note 41. Be-
cause Europe has to contend with at least five standard bodies,
delays in type acceptance are common. The five bodies are: (1)
CEN/CENELEC; (2) CCITT; (3) ECMA; (4) ETSI; and (5)
ISO/IECJTCI. ETSI is the standards body responsible for pri-
vate telecommunications networks. Id.
'" NOAM, supra note 19, at 309 (noting that in 1990,
France was accused of delaying type-approvals for foreign
companies).
180 See Arthur D. Little Report, supra note 4, at 8.
151 Id.
"" Comments from Networked Economy Conference in
Washington (C-SPAN television broadcast, Sept. 1995).
153 Id.
18 NOAM, supra note 19, at 177 (noting that even after the
1989 restructuring, the Dutch PTO continued to prohibit inter-
connection with the public network).
18' For example, in France and Germany, although private
networking has been allowed, private networks conveying public
fic,' 5" acts as one of the most significant barriers to
the establishment of private networks in Europe. Be-
cause PTOs are expected to, retain their dominance
for some time after liberalization on January 1,
1998, PTO reluctance to consummate fair and
timely interconnection agreements may pose as one
of the thorniest barriers to future private networks
proliferation.'
IV. EU PROPOSALS AND MEASURES
The following section is a synopsis of the mea-
sures taken thus far by the EU to facilitate corporate
networking both at the Member State and Pan-Eu-
ropean level.
A. The 1988 Terminal Equipment Directive and
Family
The major thrust of the 1988 Terminal Equip-
ment Directive was to remove all "special and exclu-
sive" rights over terminal equipment held by
PTOs. 1 57 In the seven years that followed, the direc-
tive has succeeded in giving competitors the ability to
import, market, connect, bring into service, and
maintain terminal equipment such as PBXs, phones,
and faxes within the EU.5 8 In addition, Article 4 of
the directive, which requires Member States to en-
sure users have access to the termination points of
the public network and the physical characteristics of
these points are published, has facilitated the process
of interconnection.
traffic are prohibited from interconnecting with the PSTN. See
DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note 3, at 13-14; John
Blau, Services Directive Applied Unevenly, COMM. WK. INT'L,
Mar. 22, 1993, at 42.
'5a In the United States, since 1967 corporate users have
been allowed to interconnect non-Bell equipment such as PBXs
to the PSTN in order to set up end-to-end private networks. In
re Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 430, 434-35 (1967).
18 Commission Diiective 88/301/EEC on Competition in
the Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, 1988
O.J. (L 131) 73 [hereinafter The Terminal Equipment
Directive].
18 Art. I of The Terminal Equipment Directive defines ter-
minal equipment as:
equipment directly or indirectly connected to the termina-
tion of a public telecommunications network to send, pro-
cess or receive information. A connection is indirect if
equipment is placed between the terminal and the termi-
nation of the network. In either case (direct or indirect),
the connection may be made by wire, optical fiber or
electromagnetically.
Id. at 1988 O.J. (L 131) 75.
19961
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Regarding type-approval of terminal equipment,
in 1986 the EU adopted the First Phase Directive in
order to reduce the barriers associated with the type-
approval of terminal equipment in the Member
States. 69 In particular, the directive required Mem-
ber States to recognize, when performed by approved
national laboratories, conformance tests that satisfied
certain common specifications. The upshot of the di-
rective was to obviate the need for terminal equip-
ment that passed tests in one Member State to be re-
tested in other Member States for purposes of type-
approval. In 1991, the EU adopted the Second Phase
Directive, which repealed the First Phase Directive
and put in place a regime requiring Member States
to implement an EU-wide type-approvals procedure
whereby terminal equipment approved in one coun-
try would be capable of interconnection to the PSTN
in another Member State, without any further
approval.' °
B. The 1990 Services Directive'""
The crux of the 1990 Services Directive was the
liberalization of the European valued-added services
market including the market for corporate and CUG
communications services. 62 In particular, the direc-
tive required Member States to "withdraw all spe-
cial and exclusive rights for the supply of telecom-
munications services other than voice telephony ...
and to ensure that any operator is entitled to supply
such telecommunications services." '68 Although the
implementation of the directive has been instrumen-
tal in facilitating corporate and CUG networking in
the EU, at the same time it has also been somewhat
169 Council Directive 86/361/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the
Initial Stage of the Mutual Recognition of Type Approval for
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, 1986 O.J. (L 217)
21.
oo See, e.g., HORROCKS, supra note 146, § 9. Council Di-
rective 91/263/EEC of 29 April 1991 on the Approximation of
Laws of the Member States Concerning Telecommunications
Terminal Equipment, Including the Mutual Recognition of
Their Conformity, 1991 O.J. (L 128) 1.
... 1990 Services Directive, as amended, supra note 69, at
1994 O.J. (L 268) 15.
16' Public voice telephony was excluded from the scope of
the 1990 Services Directive in order to safeguard revenues
needed by the PTOs for universal service obligations. Id. at 1990
O.J. (L 192) 12. When adopting the directive, the Commission
considered that the task of general economic interest assigned to
telecommunications organizations, i.e., the provision and ex-
ploitation of a universal network having general geographic cov-
erage, would be jeopardized by the opening up of voice teleph-
ony to the public, as the financial resources for the development
of the network still derived mainly from the operation of the
problematic because of the directive's definition of
"voice telephony" which has allowed Member States
and their respective PTOs to forestall the establish-
ment of certain corporate and CUG networks.'" In
particular, it has allowed Member States and PTOs
to give voice telephony a broad definition and corpo-
rate and CUG telephony a narrow definition under
the national laws and regulations that implement the
1990 Service Directive."'
Unlike e-mail, remote database access, voice pag-
ing, least-cost routing, and intelligent network func-
tions that are clearly liberalized because they are not
considered "public" voice telephony and do not typi-
cally interconnect at both ends of the PSTN, 1' cor-
porate, and particularly CUG telephony services
have run up against restrictive national rules because
they are much closer to "public" voice telephony and
may interconnect at both ends of the PSTN. a7 Nev-
ertheless, the Commission has clarified that CUG te-
lephony should be liberalized as long as CUGs meet
the following definition:
[CUGs are] those entities, not necessarily bound by eco-
nomic links, but which can be identified as being part of a
group on the basis of a lasting professional relationship
among themselves, or with another entity of the group,
and whose internal communications needs result from the
common interest underlying the relationship. In general,
the link between the members of the group is a common
business activity. 6
Corporate telephony services, which are less prob-
lematic than CUGs telephony services, are liberal-
ized under the directive as long as the provision of
such services does not involve connection to the
telephone service. Id.; Ravaioli & Sandier, supra note 141, at 8.
The rationale behind the exception for public voice telephony is
the need for public operators to retain the revenue derived there-
from in order to maintain a universal service network. Id.
"' Art. 2 of the 1990 Services Directive, supra note 69, at
1990 O.J. (L 192) 15.
16 Art. 1 of the 1990 Services Directive defines voice teleph-
ony as:
the commercial provision for the public of the direct trans-
port and switching of speech in real-time between public
switched network termination points, enabling any user to
use equipment connected to such a network termination
point in order to communicate with another termination
point.
Id.
168 See Blau, supra note 155, at 42 (discussing the various
definitions Member States have given CUGs and corporations).
W The 1990 Services Directive liberalized VPNs. See, e.g.,
Beishon, supra note 47, at 12.
167 Id.
'" See 1995 Services Status Report, supra note 107, at 18.
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PSTN at both ends."6 9 In other words, such services
must not provide "break in" and "break out" capa-
bility. 170 Break in and break out occurs when some-
one outside a corporation calls the corporate network
(breaks in) and then uses the corporate network to
bypass the long distance network by breaking out of
the corporate network at a different site, and thus
reconnecting back to the PSTN (i.e., a non-corporate




On another note, the directive has been instru-
mental in fostering corporate networking by remov-
ing certain barriers associated with leased line provi-
sion. For instance, Article 4 of the directive requires
that "Member States . . .ensure that operators who
so request can obtain leased lines within a reasona-
ble period . . . ." In addition, Article 5 of the direc-
tive requires Member States to "ensure that the
characteristics of the technical interfaces necessary
for the use of public networks are published.
'1 7 2
Overall, these provisions and the directive's general
liberalization provisions have, notwithstanding some
definitional problems associated with "voice teleph-
ony," been instrumental in fostering corporate and
CUG networking in Europe.
78
C. The 1990 ONP Framework Directive
The 1990 ONP Framework Directive was
adopted to ensure the success of the 1990 Services
Directive. In particular, whereas the 1990 Services
... Levine, supra note 135, at 50 (noting that under the
1990 Services Directive, "competitive carriers can provide pri-
vate networks, including switched virtual private voice networks
• . .for single users or closed user groups as long as at least one
end of each call is directly linked to a customer's premises - for
example, to a PBX").
170 See Ravaioli & Sandler, supra note 141, at 13. "Break
out" occurs when a customer calls the corporation (the call
originates on public network), and the corporation switches the
call internally to a remote office over its own private network.
"Break in" occurs when a call originates on a private network
and terminates on the public network. Id.
171 See 1990 Services Directive, art. 4, supra note 69, at
1990 O.J. (L 192) 16.
172 Art. 4 and Art. 5, see id. at 1990 O.J. (L 192) 16.
171 See 1995 Services Status Report, supra note 107, at 10-
16.
17' ONP Framework Directive, supra note 85, at 1990 0. J.
(L 192) 1. As a framework directive, the ONP Directive is in-
tended to be a blueprint for more specific directives in the areas
of: (1) leased lines; (2) packet-and circuit switched data services;
(3) integrated services digital networks; (4) voice telephony ser-
vice; (5) telex service; and (6) mobile services. Id., Annex 1, at
1990 0. J. (L 192) 6.
178 The ONP concept is similar to the Open Network Archi-
Directive liberalized the provision of value-added
services, the 1990 ONP Framework Directive estab-
lished conditions for service providers and users of
value-added services to access public network infra-
structure and services under fair, transparent, and
non-discriminatory terms."' The directive furthers
this goal by harmonizing the general terms and con-
ditions of such access throughout Europe.' The
three principal areas of harmonization under the di-
rective are harmonization of: (1) technical interfaces
(i.e., network termination points); (2) usage and sup-
ply conditions (i.e., standardized terms for delivery
time, repair time, and conditions for resale of capac-
ity, etc.); and (3) cost orientation and unbundling of
tariffs for basic network elements.' 76 These provi-
sions have, in the five years since their adoption,
been instrumental in aiding the general liberalization
of VAN services and international telecommunica-
tions, as mandated by the 1990 Services Directive.'
7
They have also placed a notable downward pressure
on tariffs.
76
D. 1992 ONP Leased Lines Directive
7 9
The 1992 ONP Leased Lines Directive applies
the principles of the ONP Framework Directive to
the provision of leased lines throughout the EU. The
most notable provision of the directive is probably
Article 7, which requires Member States to ensure
the "provision of a minimum set of leased lines in
accordance with harmoni[z]ed technical characteris-
tecture ("ONA") concept used in the United States. In particu-
lar, "ONA [in the] U.S. permits enhanced or information ser-
vices providers to interconnect to the basic network and choose
from a variety of network services." See Commissioner Susan
Ness, Fundamental Regulatory Principles for the Information
Infrastructure, Remarks to OECD Special Session (Apr. 1995),
in DAILY DIG., Apr. 19, 1995; see also Lusa, supra note 114, at
22.
178 OPEN NETWORK PROVISION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AN OPEN MARKET FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE EURO-
PEAN UNION, OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MISSION (1994).
177 John Matthews & Fash Darabi, The Local Loop: Mar-
ket, Technical and Regulatory Strategies, OVUM LTD (1994),
at 29.
178 Id.
17' Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the
Application of Open Network Provision to Leased Lines, 1992
O.J. (L 165) 27 [hereinafter ONP Leased Lines Directive], as
amended by Commission Decision 94/439/EC on Amendment
of Annex II of Council Directive 92/44/EEC, 1994 O.J. (L
181) 40. The Directive defines "open network provision condi-
tions" as the conditions concerning the open and efficient access
to public telecommunications network services and the efficient
use of those networks and services. Id.
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tics."18 Another important article is Article 4, which
requires Member States to ensure that information
on the supply conditions of leased lines is published
and transparent. Information must be transparent
and include information regarding (1) the ordering
procedures; (2) typical delivery periods; (3) the con-
tractual periods; and (4) the typical repair times for
typical classes of leased lines.18 Finally, Article 6 of
the directive is aimed at removing restrictions on the
interconnection of leased lines, 82 and Article 10 is
aimed at making leased lines more cost-oriented. 88
Although Member States have not fully imple-
mented this directive into national law,"" it has had
the salubrious effect in the last three years of
prompting many PTOs to cut tariffs and relax usage
conditions on leased lines.1"5 Indeed, PTOs in
France, Spain, Italy, and Germany in this period
have cut their domestic leased line tariffs by one-
half.'88 Although tariffs will drop even lower with
the introduction of infrastructure competition,' 8 7
PTOs are still expected to retain artificially high tar-
iffs for leased lines as long as they retain dominance
over the market. 88
E. Public Voice Telephony Council Resolution
On July 22, 1993, the European Council set Jan-
uary 1, 1998 as the date for full liberalization of
180 Art. 7 of the ONP Leased Lines Directive requires that
Member States ensure that their PTOs offer: (1) two or four
wires analogue, ordinary quality voice bandwidth; (2) two or
four wires analogue, special quality voice bandwidth; and (3)
2Mbit/s digital structured. For specific technical specifications,
see id. at 1994 O.J. (L 181) 41.
181 Transparency essentially requires that information be
published in a way that offers users easy access and that refer-
ence be made to the publication in the National Official Journal.
Such information includes, information about technical charac-
teristics, tariffs, supply conditions, licensing requirements, and
conditions for attachment of terminal equipment. See
Harmonisation of Legislation, Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Technology, COMMON MARKET REP. (CCH) 3516G
(1995).
18 Art. 6 (1) of the Directive provides that access to and
usage of leased lines can only be restricted on the basis of condi-
tions aimed at ensuring essential requirements. Essential re-
quirements include conditions to safeguard the security of net-
work operations, maintenance of network integrity,
interoperability of services, and the protection of data. Essential
requirements do not include technical restrictions such as the
limitation of transmission speeds. ONP Leased Lines Directive,
supra note 179, at 1992 O.J. (L 165) 30.
183 Art. 10 (2) of the ONP Leased Lines Directive requires
that Member States ensures that a suitable cost accounting sys-
tem was implemented by their TOs by December 31, 1993. Id.
voice telephony services to the general public.'89
However, there are certain derogations from this
deadline for the EU's smaller Member States that
would permit them to put off liberalization for an-
other three or five years. Nevertheless, when liberali-
zation of this sector comes, it is expected to galvanize
both facilities based long-distance and resale compe-
tition throughout Europe and at the Member State
level.
F. Proposal for ONP Voice Telephony Directive'90
This directive was submitted by the European
Commission for formal adoption on March 31, 1995.
The directive will apply the principles of the 1990
ONP Framework Directive to the post January 1,
1998 liberalized voice telephony market. The direc-
tive will also establish harmonized terms and condi-
tions for resale of voice telephony services. In partic-
ular, it will seek to establish fair and efficient access
to fixed public telephone networks and public teleph-
ony services, and will seek to assure the availability
throughout the EU of a harmonized voice telephone
service.' The directive will also apply the ONP
principle of nondiscrimination to the general areas of
technical access, tariffs, quality of service, delivery
and repair time, network and customer information,
and the fair distribution of capacity.
at 1992 O.J. (L 165) 32.
184 See generally Implementing European Telecommunica-
tions Law, Conference Reports, European Commission DGXIII
(Nov. 21-22, 1994).
188 See Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part I, supra note 2,
at 17-19.
188 See Peter Heywood, Leased-Line Forecast: Deeper Price
Cuts, DATA COMM., Feb. 1995, at 55.
187 Id.
188 CIT RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 34, at 9 (noting
that "[w]e expect only a few providers to challenge the domi-
nance of the incumbent PTO in the provision of simple leased
capacity.").
188 Council Resolution of 22 July 1993 on the Review in the
Telecommunications Sector and the Need for Further Develop-
ment in that Market, 1993 O.J. (C 213) 1. Possible derogations
of up to five years were provided for Greece, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain. The very small Luxembourg network can, where jus-
tified, be granted a transition period of two years. In the
meantime, Spain has announced that it will attempt to abide by
the official deadline of January 1, 1998 for full liberalization.
1995 Services Status Report, supra note 107, at 8 n.6.
'90 Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive on the Application of Open Network Provi-
sion (ONP) to Voice Telephony, 1995 O.J. (C 122) 4.
191 Id., Art. 1., at 1995 O.J. (C 122) 9.
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G. Mutual Recognition of Services
The European Commission has twice proposed di-
rectives aimed at implementing a pan-EU licensing
system for the mutual recognition of services. These
directives would have established procedures al-
lowing a provider of telecommunications services in
one Member State to provide services in other Mem-
ber States without the need for the provider to obtain
individual authorizations from each of the national
licensing authorities.192 However, due to Member
State sensibilities over the concentration of power at
the EU level, the adoption of these directives has
been forestalled. 9 ' In the interim, the European
Telecommunications Office ("ETO") in Copenha-
gen, Denmark has been established as a clearing-
house for pan-EU service provision applications."
Although this office will fall short of mutual recogni-
tion of license, it will go a long way in facilitating
the provision of pan-European services by providing
an applicant with a one-stop-shop filing procedure.
Recently, the idea of establishing an FCC-like au-
thority to administer licensing in the EU has been
broached in the context of the 1994 Bangemann Re-
port, a report prepared by a committee of EU
wisemen, as requested by the EU Council.' 95 The
issue has since stimulated a great deal of interest, but
its feasibility within the present EU political envi-
ronment is dubious.'9 6
H. Public Network Infrastructure Council Resolu-
tion of November 17, 1994
On November 17, 1994 the EU Council agreed to
liberalize network infrastructure throughout Europe
by January 1, 1998. As with basic voice telephony,
102 See Harmonisation of Legislation, supra note 181,
3518.
10' Commission Proposal for Council Directive on the Mu-
tual Recognition of Licenses and Other National Authorisations
for Telecommunications Services, COM(94)41 final, amending
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Mutual Recognition of
Licences and Other National Authorisations for Telecommuni-
cations Services, Including the Establishment of a Single Com-
munity Telecommunications Licence and the Setting up of a
Community Telecommunications Committee (CTC),
COM(92)254 final; see also Proposal for a Directive on a Policy
for the Mutual Recognition of Licenses and Other National Au-
thorizations for the Provision of Satellite Network Services and/
or Satellite Communications Services, COM(93)652 final.
194 The ETO is an office being established under the um-
brella of European Committee for Telecommunications Regula-
tory Affairs (ECTRA). See Green Paper on Infrastructure, Part
II, supra note 102, at 132-33.
"' EUROPE AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY:
the smaller and less developed Member States
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Luxembourg)
have been given limited derogations from implement-
ing the. January 1, 1998 deadline.' 97 In any event,
the liberalization of this sector is expected to signifi-
cantly reduce leased lines tariffs and augment the
supply of high capacity leased lines.
I. Proposed Directive on Cable TV Infrastructure
Because of the current shortfall in high capacity
digital leased lines and the associated competitive
disadvantages suffered by EU businesses, the Com-
mission decided in December 1994 to adopt this di-
rective in order to liberalize cable TV infrastructure
for the provision of leased lines to users and provid-
ers of services liberalized under the 1990 Service Di-
rective.'98 Although the Commission has the author-
ity to directly adopt such a directive under its
competition authority (Article 90 of the Treaty of
Rome), it has decided to circulate the directive
among the other institutions of the EU in order to
garner the necessary political support. The directive
should be formally adopted by the Spring of 1996.
As it stands, it would require a cable operator to of-
fer capacity to a service provider at a fair-market
price (i.e., equal access), which, in effect, would
make cable operators wholesalers of transmission ca-
pacity.' 99 It should also help reduce overall costs for
leased lines, and enhance the supply of high capacity
leased lines (as with full liberalization in 1998).2oo
J. Proposed ONP Directive on Interconnection
The Commission is currently drafting a directive
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (May 26,
1994) (inter-governmental document presented to European
Union leaders) (available from author).
"' See Europe's Way to the Information Society-An Ac-
tion Plan: Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament and to the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of Regions, COM(94)347 final at
8.
o ' Council Resolution of 22 December 1994 on the Princi-
ples and Timetable for the Liberalisation of Telecommunica-
tions Infrastructures, 1994 O.J. (C379) 4. As is the case with
the liberalization of telecommunications services, Greece, Ire-
land, Portugal and Spain have been given until the year 2003 to
liberalize. Luxembourg has until 2000. See generally id.
198 See, e.g., The Commission Opens Cable TV Networks to
Liberalised Telecoms Services, supra note 123, at 3.
See generally id.
200 Currently, within the EU, only the UK permits cable
carriage of services other than simple one-way broadcasting. Id.
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that will apply the principles of the 1990 ONP
Framework Directive to the area of interconnec-
tion. °1 This directive would establish the conditions
for interconnection in the post-liberalized environ-
ment in 1998, and would be aimed at fostering the
development of pan-European services.2 0 2 Generally,
the directive would require that fair, nondiscrimina-
tory, and proportionate conditions are applied to all
interconnection arrangements. It would also require
that PTOs entertain all reasonable requests for in-
terconnection by competitors. However, the directive
would leave the actual supervision of interconnection
arrangements to the Member States, unless EU type
antitrust questions arise. 03
K. Commission's Policies and Decisions
Apart from directives liberalizing the EU telecom-
munications sector, the EU has adopted other mea-
sures aimed at fostering trans-European networks,
such as measures to develop Euro-ISDN, which
should help to establish a homogeneous European
public network accessible to the general public at af-
fordable rates. In regard to Euro-ISDN, the Com-
mission has adopted two specific proposals regarding
the implementation of Euro-ISDN, and has adopted
a general program of funding research projects that
support ISDN and other similar projects.
2 0 4
In addition, by virtue of its competition authority
under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission has been
able to condition merger approvals on market liber-
20' Draft Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Directive on Interconnection to Public Telecommunications Net-
works and Public Telecommunications Services in the Context of
Open Network Provision (ONP), 1995 O.J. (C-.) (draft re-
leased May 18, 1995) [hereinafter Interconnection Proposal]; see
also Legislative Programme to Implement the Future Regula-
tory Framework for Telecommunications, I&T MAG., July
1995, at 6.
202 The directive will set forth general rules regarding cost-
orientation, cross-subsidization, collocation of equipment, facili-
ties sharing, number portability, technical standards, publication
and access to information and resolution of cross border disputes.
See Interconnection Proposal, supra note 201.
208 See European Telecom Survey-Part II of Infrastructure
Competition Paper Issued, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP. INT'L,
Feb. 3, 1995, at 4.
'" See Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament on Preparatory Actions in the
Field of Trans-European Networks: Integrated Broadband
Communications (TEN-IBC), COM(93)372 final; see also 1993
ISDN Communication, supra note 74.
208 For example, the recent approval by the European Com-
mission and the U.S. Justice Department of the Sprint alliance
with France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom was hinged on the
liberalization of the German and French markets. More pre-
alization, such as the recent Atlas merger applica-
tion. In turn, this is helping to facilitate liberaliza-
tion at the Member States level.20 5 The Commission
has also used this authority to give clearance to
mergers that facilitate pan-EU networking, such as
the informal clearance it has given to the European
Virtual Private Networks Users Association
("EVUA"), a closed user group aimed at obtaining
for its forty or so multinational members economi-
cally advantageous pan-EU VPN services.206
V. HASTENING THE PROCESS OF DEREG-
ULATION
Because of the microeconomic and macroeconomic
importance of telecommunications to Europe's econ-
omy, marketplace forces are driving liberalization
with little regard for PTO concerns over "cream
skimming," bypass, and universal service. As a re-
sult, even though full liberalization is not scheduled
until 1998 for most Member States, economic con-
siderations and competitive forces will hasten the
process in advance of 1998.
A. Microeconomic Considerations
Europe's domestic telecommunications industry
currently constitutes three percent of Europe's over-
all gross domestic product ("GDP") and is expected
to reach seven percent by the year 2000 °.2" The
cisely, Sprint has entered into a consent decree that will prohibit
the joint venture from buying services from either France
Telecom or Deutsche Telekom until Germany and France open
up their markets to competition. The decree also prohibits the
joint venture from owning a public data network or any other
monopoly assets owned by France Telecom or Deutsche
Telekom. Similar deregulatory pressures have also followed in
the wake of the AT&T/Unisource and BT/MCI alliances. Eu-
ropean Official Scrutinizing New Plan For Global Telecom
Venture, WASH. TELECOM WK., Sept. 22, 1995, at 1.
208 The EVUA arrangement was approved so long as the
telecommunications services provided thereto comported with the
1990 Services Directive. Accordingly, the Commission condi-
tioned its approval. The virtual private network upon which the
members of EVUA were to receive the networking services had
to be structured so that none of the members could inter-commu-
nicate, i.e., no simultaneous "break out" and "break in" facility.
However, this provision allowed for communication between an
individual company and its customers and suppliers, who could
either break in or break out, but not both. See Viatel Goes
Cross-Border with Europe's First Voice Network, FIN. TIMES
TELECOM MARKETS, Nov. 25, 1993; see also Dawn Hayes,
Euro-VPN Deal Struck, COMM. WK, INT'L, Apr. 11, 1994, at 1.
207 See Leon Brittan, Speech Before the IIC Telecom Fo-
rum, WASH. TELECOM WK., July 21, 1995, at 4.
[Vol. 4
CORPORATE NETWORKING - EUROPEAN UNION
specter of losing this sector to foreign competition
has begun to galvanize most of Europe's PTOs into
preparing for the impending post 1998 liberalized
environment.20 8 Indeed, in the aftermath of interna-
tional deregulation, the competitive threat is ever
present as a multitude of large foreign carriers set
out to capture part of the lucrative fifty billion dollar
market for international corporate voice and data
services.209 At the EU-level, a similar competitive
threat introduced by the 1990 Services Directive and
ONP Directives has allowed foreign competitors to
forge alliances210 with PTOs in order that they may
compete with incumbent PTOs211 in their home
markets through the hubbing of corporate networks,
the provisioning of pan-EU VPNs, call-back, and
calling card services.212
Having been mistreated by the smug and compla-
cent PTOs for years, large multinational corpora-
tions in Europe have welcomed this dose of foreign
competition and are showing a willingness to jump
ship. Because multinational corporations and busi-
ness clients in general represent the most important
20" See Arthur D. Little Report, supra note 4, at 9. "In the
past, European TOs have tended so far to avoid intrusions on
each others' territories. The U.S. TOs have no such inhibitions
in Europe. European TOs are now beginning to compete di-
rectly with each other - particularly in the market for building
and operating private international networks for large multina-
tional user companies." Id.; see also Dawn Hayes, MFS Plots
ATM Data Hubs in Europe, COMM. WK. INT'L, Feb. 21, 1994,
at 34 (noting that "U.S. competitive access provider MFS Com-
munications Co. plans to roll out commercial ATM-based data
services in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom by
June-before most European Telecommunications operators.").
... Baie Netzer, Europeans Form Alliances, HERALD TRIB.
INT'L, Nov. 29, 1994.
110 Heywood, supra note 186, at 55. "Within Europe, PTOs
wanting to establish themselves as global companies, are compet-
ing with one another to hub corporate networks." Id.
"" Lyle Ginsburg & Yves Londenchamp, The Process for
Dynamic Service Provisioning, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Oct.
1994, at 27 ("The PTOs are vulnerable to competition because
of their high-cost, relatively inefficient operations, their rigid
pricing structures, and their traditional civil-service cultures.
Newer entrants, with their smaller size, lower-cost operations
and customer-service orientation, will be able to offer rapidly a
wide range of customized, flexibly priced services."); see also
McAdam, supra note 53, at 39.
Customers, particularly multinationals, have begun to ex-
ercise their right of choice between telecommunications
services, choosing to place network hubs, and often busi-
ness operations, in countries with liberal regimes, and
routing only peripheral traffic to and from monopoly and
high priced countries where service provision is inflexible
and technologically underdeveloped.
Id.
s See id. at 38. "Arbitrageurs do not need to operate
revenue sources for PTOs,2" (indeed, revenues de-
rived from business clients represent fifty to sixty
percent of the total EU telecommunications market,
which is roughly valued at forty-one billion ecu),
PTOs can no longer risk alienating these custom-
ers.2"' Thus, European PTOs have begun to change
their ways in order to maintain this revenue source
over the long term.21 ' In short, the specter of full
competition in 1998, along with the present competi-
tion taking place in various niche telecommunica-
tions markets, is spurring liberalization in the EU at
an increasingly quicker pace.2 This, in turn, is
helping to foster corporate networking in the EU.
B. Macroeconomic Considerations
Because the EU telecommunications market is not
as liberalized as that of the United States, telecom-
munications costs have been heavier for EU busi-
nesses. In fact, European companies must spend, on
average, two to three times more for telecommunica-
tions services than companies in the United States.2
within a country to attack international telecommunications rev-
enues. They can be attacked from long range, through refile,
calling cards and leased line bypass." Id. See also Arthur D.
Little Report, supra note 4, at 9. "Hub competition will grow
stronger as transmission costs decrease, as network intelligence
increases, and as more and more value-added telecommunica-
tions suppliers emerge with liberalization." Id.
218 See NOAM, supra note 19, at 45.
214 Ginsburg & Londenchamp, supra note 211, at 27.
... See Cane, supra note 19, at 1, quoting:
In Europe it will be years before the bureaucratic and ar-
rogant attitudes ingrained in many telecoms operators -
through a deadly combination of state ownership and mo-
nopolistic service provision-are eliminated .. .This is
the justification for the formation last year of the Euro-
pean Virtual Private Network Users' Association, a lobby
of 40 of Europe's largest companies . .. [which] aim to
force the large telecoms operators to listen to their
requirements.
Id.
216 See 1995 Services Status Report, supra note 107, at 4
(noting that on July 19, 1994, the European Commission pub-
lished an Action Plan titled "Europe's Way to the Information
Society" in which the Commission "emphasized the need for
continued and accelerated liberalization of telecommunications");
see also Jennifer L. Schenker, Atlas Future Linked to Market
Access, COMM. WK. INT'L, Oct. 10, 1994. "The European Com-
mission will refuse to approve Atlas, the joint venture between
France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom, until network infra-
structure competition is introduced in France and Germany." Id.
217 See DTI INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY, supra note 3, at ix,
69 (stating that ten percent of Reuter's overall operational costs
are for telecommunications services, and that Reuters, which has
the largest private network in the world, has prepared a compar-
ison of costs it would incur in Europe with the costs it would
1996]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
For example, whereas overall telecommunications
costs as a percentage of business turnover are about
sixteen percent in the United States, they are nearly
thirty percent in Germany. 18 Although the PTOs
may benefit from these high telecommunications
costs, the rest of the EU economy suffers competitive
disadvantages because high telecommunications costs
make European made or produced products and ser-
vices more expensive.
If the EU is to become more competitive in the
evolving international marketplace, it must be able to
obtain high quality and affordable communications,
particularly now that it stands at the doorstep of the
"information age." '219 In a world of "networked cap-
italism,"'22 effective corporate networks and low
communications costs will be a sine qua non for cor-
porate survival.221 Thus, it is no surprise that this
existing disparity in costs between the EU and the
United States has spurred European users to de-
mand from PTOs and national governments a has-
tening of liberalization in the European telecommu-
nications market. PTOs who fail to meet these
demands and abuse their dominant positions for
short term gain, will lose user traffic to savvy United
States and United Kingdom operators who for years
have been schooled in competitive and consumer ori-
ented business practices. This threat has also created
a trend toward liberalization in advance of 1998 and
this is further fostering the establishment of private
networks in the EU. Evidence of this trend can be
gleaned from statistics on the growth in investment
in the investment level of information technology be-
ing made by European industry, a growth rate that
has been growing at two to three times the rate of
the EU's overall economy.222
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has long had a favorable regu-
latory environment that has fostered the proliferation
incur if its entire network were in the USA, which shows a sav-
ings of 90%).
8 d. at 66.
219 See Brittan, supra note 207, at 4, 5.
Competitiveness depends on access to efficient, high qual-
ity and low cost communications. European industry must
be able to communicate at low-cost and to take advantage
of the most modern ways of transmitting information elec-
tronically if it is to compete in world markets. Trade in
telecommunications is thus a facilitator of trade in other
sectors.
Id.
2 Chairman Reed Hundt, Remarks in Promethee, Paris,
of private networks. Europe has only recently begun
to establish a similar regulatory environment. The
establishment of the EU regulatory environment
harkens back to a 1987 Green Paper that spawned a
number of European directives, such as the 1990
Services Directive, liberalizing corporate and CUG
communications services, and the ONP Directives,
harmonizing the conditions for fair access to public
network infrastructure and services. These directives
have established an environment in which many of
the preexisting barriers to corporate and CUGs
networking in Europe have been removed. However,
because the sectors of public voice telephony and net-
work infrastructure may remain under de jure mo-
nopoly control until January 1, 1998, or even longer
for some Member States, PTOs are able to erect
(and have been erecting) barriers to corporate and
CUG networking in order to protect important reve-
nue streams. At the same time, international compe-
tition in the areas of international VPNs, interna-
tional simple resale, private lines, call-back, re-file,
and calling cards, has and will continue to threaten
the ability of PTOs to continue to use their monopo-
lies to erect such barriers. As a consequence, the
ability of corporations and CUGs to establish corpo-
rate networks in the coming years should be progres-
sively facilitated as competitive alternatives force the
PTOs to remove remaining barriers. PTOs will be
further forced to remove these barriers as a result of
economic imperatives at the microeconomic and
macroeconomic level, which will lead governments
and industry to demand that barriers to corporate
communications be removed. In upshot, it can be dis-
cerned that the initial deregulatory directives taken
by the EU and the competition that has flowed
therefrom, along with the present directives being
formulated by the EU in toto, have begun the pro-
cess of truly fostering corporate networking in the
EU.
France (July 19, 1995), in DAILY DIG., July 19, 1995, at 2444
(stating that "[wle are entering the age of networked
capitalism").
2 See Amsterdam Conference Paper, supra note 41. "Busi-
ness communications networks crossing national boundaries,
providing full feature integration are being demanded more and
more by companies wishing to maintain their competitive edge
in the multinational business market." Id.
222 See FUTURE POLICY FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN-
FRASTRUCTURES AND CATV NETWORKS, REPORT FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION - DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS (DGXIII), MERCER MANAGEMENT CON-
SULTANTS 1 (1994).
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